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Introduction
The present essay collection is a doctoral dissertation in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of dr. oecon. at the Norwegian School of
Economics and Business Administration (NHH). The dissertation consists
of five separate essays of which one is a literature review. The aim of the
research papers is to contribute to the understanding of the economics of
fisheries management. More specifically, the essays consider what optimal
extraction from a biomass is, how the harvest (long-run supply curves)
changes with different regulatory regimes, how uncertainty affects extrac-
tion policies, the effect of switching costs in an uncertain fishery, and what
optimal short-term capacity utilisation for a fishing fleet is. As a case study,
the Norwegian pelagic fishery is used through out the dissertation. The
purpose of this introduction is to motivate the choice of topics and to put
the essays in perspective. As chapter 1 is a literature review, I will only
give a brief presentation of some of the relevant literature here. The last
part provides an outline of the dissertation.
In his inaugural address at the International Fisheries Exhibition in
1
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London 1883, Thomas Henry Huxley made the following statement (cited
in Gordon, 1954):
"1 believe, then, that the cod fishery, the herring fishery, the
pilchard fishery, the mackerel fishery, and probably all the great
sea fisheries, are inexhaustible; that is to say, that nothing we
do seriously affects the number of the fish. And any attempt to
regulate these fisheries seems consequently, from the nature of
the case, to be useless."
Huxley was not alone in his opinion of the great sea fisheries being in-
exhaustible; his views were shared by many, including fisheries biologists
as late as in the 1950s. With the collapse of many commercial fisheries, e.g.
the North Atlantic herring fisheries in the 1960s and 1970s, it has become
evident that regulations of some kind are not anymore useless, but crucial
to avoid rent dissipation in commercial fisheries.
Considering the high fishing power of modem fishing fleets, it is be-
yond doubt that human activity can affect the abundance of fish in the
oceans. This however does not explain the rent dissipation that takes place
in unregulated fisheries (and for that matter in many regulated fisheries).
Fish stocks are considered common property resources and the rent dissi-
pation problem in unregulated fisheries has to do with the difficulties in
assigning property rights to fish resources. In his seminal paper, Gordon
(1954) identified how the lack of property rights leads to excessive fish-
ing effort and over-exploitation of the resource; a scenario known as "the
3tragedy of the commons" (Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 1968). A large branch of
the fisheries economics literature deals with how fisheries should be regu-
lated to avoid rent dissipation. In the following I give a brief presentation
of two strands of the fisheries management literature of particular rele-
vance to the dissertation, namely optimal harvesting of fish and capacity
utilisation in fisheries.
To avoid excessive fishing effort and over-exploitation of fish stocks,
there is a need to impose regulations in fisheries. Fisheries managers typ-
ically attempt to deal with the common property problem by use of input
and output controls Munro & Scott (1985). Input controls are imposed
to restrict fishing effort. Unless the fishery managers can control all in-
puts effectively, input controls alone cannot solve the common property
problem in the long run as fishing firms will increase harvest effort along
non-regulated dimensions. Output controls are imposed to restrict har-
vest. The most commonly used output control is the harvest quota. A total
allowable catch (TAC) can ensure sustainable catches. However, unless
fishing firms are given property rights to shares of the TAC, there may be
incentives to race for fish. Munro & Scott (1985) identify the problem of
excess capacity in regulated fisheries, which they refer to as class II open
access.
Homans & Wilen (1997) illustrate how regulated open-access fisheries
can have very high excess capacity. In a regulated open-access fishery
there is free entry but the fishery is subject to certain regulations, such as
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restrictions on the choice of fishing gear, fishing area, and season length.
The introduction of individual transferable quotas (ITQs), an approach
based on assigning property rights to the fish stocks, is a solution which
has been proposed to address these problems (see e.g. Grafton, 1996). A
well-known example of class II open access and ITQs is the Alaska Pacific
halibut fishery. In that fishery the fishing season was shortened to reduce
total landings and the fishermen responded by increasing fishing effort
to compensate for lost fishing time. This led to a progressive reduction
of the fishing season. In 1995, what used to be an annual fishery had
been reduced to a fishery with an official season of two days (see Wilen
& Homans, 1998, on the history of the Pacific halibut fishery). Individual
fishing quotas were introduced in the halibut fishery in 1995, and only a
couple of years later, the Alaska halibut season spanned 245 days per year.'
The use of input and output controls to restrict harvest raises the ques-
tion of how to set harvest quotas; what is optimal extraction over time
from a fish stock? In order to manage fish stocks well, it is essential for
the fishery regulator to have knowledge on what optimal management
of the fishery involves in terms of harvest and biomass level. From an
economist' s perspective, this can be obtained by establishing a bioeco-
nomic model of the fishery and maximising present value of net-benefits
from harvesting the resource. With the advent of optimal control theory,
1Although the introduction of individual fishing quotas turned out to be a success
in the Pacific halibut fishery, the literature also mentions many problems with using
individual fishing quotas. See e.g. Copes (1986).
5resource economics was extended from static (cf. Gordon, 1954) to a dy-
namic or capital-theoretic context (e.g. Clark, 1971, 1976; Clark & Munro,
1975).2 This made it, among many other things, possible to analyse optimal
harvesting paths (Clark, 1971).
Soon after the introduction of capital-theory as a tool for resource econo-
mists, uncertainty was introduced into bioeconomic models. Uncertainty
in bioeconomic models of fisheries was reviewed by Andersen & Sutinen
(1984). The uncertainty literature has grown considerably since their paper
was published. Chapter 1 seeks to give an overview of some of the main
developments in the field since its introduction in the early 1970s. The
literature review in chapter 1 also aims at providing a basis for chapters 3
and 4, where harvesting policies are analysed in stochastic frameworks.
Chapter 1 gives a detailed presentation of two fairly general stochas-
tic bioeconomic models, one in continuous time and one in discrete time.
These models serve as reference points for other studies that are reviewed.
The second part of the chapter provides an overview of some of the achieve-
ments and the issues that have been dealt with in stochastic bioeconomic
modelling thus far. Several applications are considered. The presented
studies serve to exemplify the range of issues that have been analysed by
incorporating uncertainty into bioeconomic models.
Market analysis is based on supply and demand. Demand functions
and market structure have received substantial attention in the fisheries
20n the evolution of modem fisheries economics, see Munro (1992).
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economic literature, very little attention has however been given to the
supply side in fisheries. The seminal paper by Copes (1970) derives the
backward-bending open-access supply curve. With the advent of optimal
control theory, Clark (1990) derived the equilibrium supply curve for an
optimally managed fishery. The literature contains few empirical stud-
ies of fisheries supply curves. Bjørndal (1987) estimated a harvest supply
function, but the purpose of his study was to use duality to retrieve the
characteristics of the underlying production technology, and the supply
function per se was not derived. The purpose of chapters 2 and 3 is to de-
rive and estimate equilibrium supply functions for the North Sea herring
fishery, i.e., how does the long-run harvest of North Sea herring change
as the price of herring changes? Long-run equilibrium supply curves are
derived, estimated, and analysed for different management regimes, both
theoretical and actual. This is done both in deterministic (chapter 2) and
stochastic (chapter 3) frameworks. The applications represent some of the
few empirical analyses of supply curves in the literature.
Chapter 3 extends the analysis in chapter 2 as I go from a deterministic
to a stochastic setting. The introduction of uncertainty in the bioeconomic
model can have large implications for the optimal harvest policy. While the
deterministic case offers useful benchmarks, many sources of uncertainty
influence real-world fisheries. Uncertainty is incorporated into the bioeco-
nomic model by multiplicatively adding a stochastic term to the equation
explaining stock-recruitment (cf. Reed, 1979). In a stochastic setting there
7is no long-run equilibrium (or steady state) and feedback policies for the
optimally managed fishery must be found, i.e., optimal levels of harvest,
stock size or effort as a function of the current state of the fishery. The
optimal feedback policy depends on stock level, but also on the price of
herring. The optimal management of North Sea herring was analysed
by Bjørndal (1987, 1988). His analyses were based on deterministic mod-
els of the fishery. Introducing uncertainty into the bioeconomic model,
as is done in chapter 3, might also give further insight into the optimal
management of North Sea herring.
The expected (or average) long-run supply curves estimated in chapter
3 are very similar to the supply curves estimated in chapter 2. In both
chapters I find that different regulations, such as apen access or optimal
management, can have substantial impact on the supply of North Sea
herring, where annual equilibrium supply can vary from zero, if the stock
is driven to extinction under open access, to a sustainable annual yield
of approximately 700 thousand tonnes under optimal management. The
reason for this difference is the effective means of harvesting schooling fish
stocks, which makes it economically viable to harvest herring even at very
low stock levels.
Chapters 2 and 3 also analyse the actual harvest policy in the fishery
from 1981 to 2001. According to chapter 3 the fishery should have re-
mained closed until1983 under optimal management, which implies that
the moratorium was lifted too early. A change in the actual regulatory
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regime was evident in 1996. The implications of this change is analysed
in chapter 2. While quotas seem to have been too high in the first part of
the period 1981-2001, the problem in the last part of the period seems to
be that the annual harvest was not large enough. This allowed the stock
to approach a higher level than what maximised rent.
One might ask why the analysis in chapter 3 was undertaken, if un-
certainty did not change any of the conclusions from chapter 2. By only
considering the expected long-term supply derived from the stochastic
model, the results are very similar to those presented in chapter 2. The
introduction of uncertainty does however give some additional insights.
Among other things, there are large seasonal fluctuations in long-run stock
and harvest (or supply) under optimal management when modelling the
fishery in a stochastic setting. Instead of harvesting the expected amount
of herring for a given price, harvest is seen to fluctuate from zero in some
periods to very high quantities in other periods because of environmental
shocks to the biomass growth. The supply curves in chapter 3 are therefore
presented as expected supply (or harvest) with confidence interval. When
employing the stochastic feedback policies to the North Sea herring fish-
ery 1981-2001, there are very large fluctuations in annualoptimal harvest.
Price and cost shift from year to year, but the analysis in chapter 3 shows
that the environmental fluctuations explain most of the annual variation
in optimal harvest.
After having studied a fishery with stochastic stock growth in chapter
93, more complexity is added to the model in chapter 4 through the intro-
duction of uncertainty to yet another dimension of the model, namely the
price dimension. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse how uncer-
tainty in stock growth and price influence the optimal harvest of fish. In
addition, I want to analyse the consequences of fleet-switching costs in a
fishery. Whereas the literature contains numerous studies of the manage-
ment of natural resources under some kind of uncertainty, most of them
only analyse how one source of uncertainty influences the bioeconomic
model. Few studies consider the effects on optimal management of sev-
eral sources of uncertainty that simultaneously affect different parts of the
bioeconomic model.
The bioeconomic model developed in chapter 4 use the well-known
deterministic, linear-control model presented by Clark &Munro (1975) as
a starting point. The solution to the Clark-Munro model is a most rapid
approach path (MRAP) to the optimal stock level. When the stock reaches
the critical level, harvest is set at some interior value, which maintains
the optimal stock level (steady state). I make several extensions to the
Clark-Munro model. First, both future price and stock are assumed uncer-
tain as price and stock-recruitment evolve according to known stochastic
processes. Second, it is assumed that changing the harvest rate in the fish-
ery is subject to certain switching costs. It seems reasonable to assume that
increasing and/or decreasing the harvest rate incurs certain costs. In this
setting, I show that the optimal policy can be defined by exit and entry
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curves in stock-price space. The duality property of the switching curves
is due to the combination of switching costs and uncertainty in the model.
Numerical methods are used to approximate the solution and to charac-
terise the optimal policy. Simulating the optimal policy over a period of
time shows that pulse fishing is the optimal behaviour in this linear-control
fishery. To my best knowledge this is the first study of optimal switching
curves in a fishery with stochastic stock and price.
The results in chapter 4 give theoretical support for the many cases of
pulse fishing found in commercial fisheries. The analysis therefore has
implications for many real-world fisheries. Looking at the sensitivity of
the results to parameter changes, price and stock volatilities do not affect
the switching curves much. The maximum harvest rate of the fishing
fleet, on the other hand, strongly affects the optimal entry and exit curves.
Furthermore, it turns out that having a larger fishing capacity results in
a more stable stock despite the fact that the fleet is pulse fishing. The
ability of a big fleet to quickly adjust the stock down to the desired level
therefore outweighs the effects on stock variability of pulse fishing with a
high capacity (or high maximal harvest rate).
Chapters 2-4 have been dealing with harvesting fish stocks. Thus far
however, the implementation of harvest quotas has not been regarded. I
have simply assumed the efficient amount of inputs is used to harvest any
given quantity of fish. As we know, even if harvest limits are imposed
to conserve the fish stock, we are not home free. A lack of property
11
rights will result in a race for shares of the total harvest, where fishermen
have incentives to increase their harvesting capacity well above what is
necessary to harvest the total allowable catch. This problem of excess
capacity is dealt with in chapter 5, where an empirical analysis of capacity
utilisation in the Norwegian pelagic fishery is carried out. In this essay it
is assumed that the total allowable catch of each species is given and the
focus is on how efficient the fishing fleet is in harvesting their given quota.
Excess capacity is a short-run measure as it is self correcting in a well-
functioning market. There is excess capacity in a fishery if the potential
catch of the current fleet is larger than the current catch (see e.g. Ward et al.,
2004). The industry has long claimed that there is a high degree of excess
capacity in the Norwegiam pelagic fishing fleet. Despite this, Bjørndal &
Gordon (2000) could not find evidence of large returns to scale in their
study of the fishery. Using new data that have been made available, I esti-
mate a multi-output generalised translog cost function in order to analyse
scale economics and whether there is excess capacity in the Norwegian
pelagic fishery. The focus in chapter 5 is on economic definitions of ca-
pacity as opposed to physical definitions. A capacity measure suggested
by Berndt &Morrison (1981) is used, and capacity output is defined as the
output that minimises short run average costs. Increasing returns to scale
therefore implies excess capacity, as minimum average cost in a single-
output production process corresponds to returns to scale equal to unity.
The empirical analysis indicates large returns to scale in every segment of
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the fishing fleet, implying that there is excess capacity. Cost advantages
can be obtained by increasing the quantity caught per vessel. However,
with total catch given, I conclude that the number of vessels taking part in
the fishery must be reduced to take advantage of scale effects.
Until recently, there have been few incentives to reduce capacity in the
Norwegian pelagic fleet. The recent introduction of a unit quota system in
the purse seine and trawl fisheries has changed this. Under the unit quota
system, the number of assigned (unit) quotas is larger than the number of
participating vessels. If a vessel with unit quotas is withdrawn from the
fishery, its quotas can be transferred to and used by other vessels. The
analysis in chapter 5 suggests that quotas per vessel should be increased
considerably to take advantage of scale effects. As the total allowable
catch in the fishery is given, increased vessel quotas can only be realised
by withdrawing vessels from the fishery. The unit quota system has the
potential of making such capacity reduction achievable. It remains to be
seen if the incentives provided by the unit quota system are strong enough
to reduce the excess capacity in the fishery.
Summing up, the questions analysed in the dissertation covers several
topics relevant to the fisheries economics literature. First, extraction of
fish from a fish stock is considered under many different assumptions
about regulatory regime, uncertainty, cost structure, etc. In this part of the
dissertation (chapters 2-4), bioeconomic modelling, optimal control theory
and numerical methods (cf. Judd, 1998) are fundamental tools. Second,
13
production structure and capacity utilisation in a fishery is analysed by
means of duality theory and econometric methods (chapter 5). The span in
topics and methods employed is perhaps large, but the topics have at least
one important common feature; they are all related to the management of
fish stocks and consequences of suboptimal regulations. The aim of the
dissertation is thus to contribute to the understanding of the economics of
fisheries management.
14 Introduction
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Abstract
The paper reviews the large body of literature dealing with uncertainty in
bioeconomic modelling of fisheries. The purpose is to provide an overview
of some of the main developments in the field since its introduction in the
early 1970s. We start by giving a detailed presentation of two fairly general
stochastic bioeconomic models, one in continuous time and one in discrete
time. These models serve as reference points for other studies we discuss.
The purpose of the second part of the paper is to provide an overview of
some of the achievements and issues that have been dealt with in stochastic
bioeconomic modelling thus far. Several applications are considered. The
studies we present serve to exemplify the range of issues that have been
analysed by incorporating uncertainty into bioeconomic models.
1.1. Introduction 19
1.1 Introduction
Uncertainty was introduced in bioeconomic models in the early 1970s
and an extensive literature has been generated since that time. The aim
of this paper is to review some of the main developments in stochastic
bioeconomic modelling. A complete survey of all aspects of the literature
is impossible in the space allocated for this paper, and the aim is rather to
present a sample of the literature to represent some of the achievements and
to exemplify the range of topics analysed by use of stochastic bioeconomic
models. For a more detailed survey of the earlier literature, the reader
might refer to Andersen & Sutinen (1984).
Walters & Hilborn (1978) list the following three categories of un-
certainty in fisheries management: (1) random effects, whose probability
distribution can be determined from past experience, (2) parameter uncer-
tainty, and (3) fundamental misunderstanding about variable choice and
model form. The various forms of uncertainty along with methods used
to analyse them are reviewed in Charles (1998). Most bioeconomic studies
focus on the first two classes of uncertainty.
The standard bioeconomic model consists of a biological component,
describing change in one or more resource stocks, and an economic part
describing net revenue, net benefits or "social welfare". Uncertainty can
be added to the model in several ways. The biological component can be
made stochastic by allowing for random fluctuations in the stock-growth
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relationship. In addition, one might assume stock levels are observed
with measurement error. Uncertainty can be introduced to the economic
component by letting prices, costs, yield-effort relationships etc. fluctuate
according to some stochastic process.
The reminder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section
we present two studies of uncertainty in bioeconomic modelling; the first
model is in discrete time whereas the second is modelled in continuous
time. These models will later serve as references when reviewing other
studies. Section 1.2 also gives a brief introduction to basic methods for
solving stochastic dynamic optimisation problems. Section 1.3 gives an
overview of applications of stochastic bioeconomic modelling. Section 1.4
concludes.
1.2 Stochastic Bioeconomic Models
In the bioeconomic literature we find stochastic models both in discrete
time and in continuous time. In this section we present two models, a
discrete-time model and a model in continuous time. The models will serve
as reference points for the remainder of the paper and they present some
basic methods used to solve stochastic dynamic optimisation problems.
The often-cited paper by Reed (1979) is presented as a point of reference
for discrete-time models. Among the models in continuous-time, we have
chosen to present Pindyck (1984) as an example. Conrad (2004) provides a
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detailed description of both Reed's and Pindyck' s models in his review of
renewable resource management.
1.2.1 A Discrete-Time Model
Reed (1979) draws on the analyses in Jaquette (1972), Jaquette (1974)
and Reed (1974), and the model is used to derive an optimal harvest policy
for a fishery. Reed (1979) uses a stochastic stock-recruitment function:
Xt+1 = 2t+1G(St), (1.1)
where Xt, St = Xt - Yt, and Y, is biomass, escapement, and harvest in
period t, respectively. 2t+1 are independent and identically distributed (iid)
random variables with mean one and constant variance, observed at the
beginning of period t + 1. G(St) is a growth function. Harvesting from
the stock is explained by the Spence production function Y, = Xt(l- e-qKt),
where Kt represents effort and q > O is a catchability coefficient.' By
assuming a constant cost per unit effort (CPUE) of c and a constant price p
per unit harvest, net revenues are given by ti, = pYt - (c/q)[ln(Xt) -ln(St)].
Using the fact that net revenues can be written as an additively separable
1Spence (1974) used this production function in his study of blue whales. The Spence
production function is a discrete-time analogue to the (continuous-time) Schaefer pro-
duction function: Let instantaneous harvest during a period be given by the Schaefer
function y(t) = qEx(t), where the period's E is fixed. Instantaneous stock change is
given by xU) = -qEx(t) and by solving this differential equation we get x(t) = Xoe-qE,.
The total harvest in a given period with initial stock XI can therefore be expressed by
Yl = X/(l - e-qE,), i.e., by the Spence production function.
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function of X and 5, we get the expression ITt = N(X) - N(S), where N(m) =
pm - (cjq)ln(m). The optimal policy is derived by maximising the expected
present value of net revenues
max Eo [t pt {N (Xt) - N (St»],
(Sd t=O
subject to (LI), O ~ Yt ~ Xt, and Xo given, where p is the discount
factor. The maximisation problem is solved using stochastic dynamic
programming. The optimal harvest policy is a constant-escapement pol-
icy where the optimal escapement level S' must maximise the equation
W(S) = pEz[N(zG(z»]. The optimal feedback policy can be expressed as:
{
rx, - 5') if x, > S'
Yt=
O if x, s S'
Stock, harvest, and effort will fluctuate over time. Given a statistical dis-
tribution for the random variable z, it is possible to find the statistical
properties of stock, harvest, etc. analytically or through numerical approx-
imations.
Reed is able to derive the optimal feedback policy analytically because
net revenues in his model can be written as an additive separable func-
tion of the state and the control variables, i.e., he uses a linear control
model. His choice of production function is crucial and a slightly differ-
ent model specification would have made it impossible to derive a closed
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form solution. Inmost stochastic bioeconomic models where net revenues
are maximised, it is very difficult (or impossible) to derive closed form
solutions and numerical approximations must be used.
1.2.2 A Continuous-Time Model
One of the first bioeconomic studies in continuous time dealing with uncer-
tainty is Ludwig (1979). Ludwig extends the classic, deterministic fishery
model of Clark (1976) by including stochastic change in the resource stock.
Ludwig's model is similar to Reed (1979) with a linear control relationship
and a fixed and exogenous resource price. Also, the optimal feedback pol-
icy derived from Ludwig's model is similar to the constant escapement pol-
icy derived from the Reed (1979)model. According to Ludwig, one should
harvest either at the maximum or the minimum harvest rate depending on
the current size of the stock (i.e., a bang-bang approach). Pindyck (1984)
extends Ludwig's model by letting price be determined by a downward
sloping demand curve. Inthe following we present Pindyck' s model which
in tum serves as a reference for other bioeconomic models in continuous
time.
InPindyck (1984) the stock evolves according to
dX = [F(X) - Yl dt + a(X)dz, (1.2)
where a'(X} > O, i.e., the variation in stock growth increases with the size
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of the stock, 0'(0) = O,and dz = €(t) Vdt is the increment of a Wiener process.
Y(t) is the harvest rate. The stock-growth function F(X) is assumed to be
strictly concave with F(O) = F(K) = O,where K > Ois the carrying capacity
of the resource in its natural environment.
Let net benefits at instant t be given by
y
U(X, Y) = f p(q)dq - c(X)Y,
o
(1.3)
where p(Y) is the downward sloping demand curve, and c(X) is unit cost
of harvesting from a stock of size X. c(X) is assumed decreasing and
strictly convex, and with c(O) = 00. Pindyck further assumes a competitive
resource market, well defined property rights, and risk-neutral firms.
Maximisation of discounted net benefits subject to (1.2) gives the fol-
lowing Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation:
W(X) = ffi{'X{!p(q)dq - c(X) Y + [F(X) - Yl V' (X) + ~a'(X) V" (X) } ,
(1.4)
where {)is the discount rate. From the maximal condition Jt·}/JY = Owe
have that p(Y') - c(X) = V' (X).
Assume stock growth is given by a logistic growth function F(X) =
rX(l - x/K), inverse demand is given by p = b2/y2, with b > O, the cost
function is c(X) = c/X2, with c> O,and cr(X)= aX. The HJB equation (1.4)
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then becomes:
{-bZ cY [( X)] 1 }oV(X) = m;x y -Xz + r 1- K - Y V' (X) + "2(jzXZV" (X) (1.5)
Using the maximal condition a{·}/ay = Owe can solve for the optimal
harvest rate:
1
Y' = b [~ + VI(X)r
z
(1.6)
Substituting for harvest rate from equation (1.6) into equation (1.5) gives
us the following second-order differential equation:
Ingeneral it can be very difficult if not impossible to find a closed form
solution to this kind of problem. In this specific case, however, Pindyck
is able to solve equation (1.7) and obtain an explicit solution for the value
function V(X). The solution is:
cp cpr
V(X) = - X - sr: (1.8)
where
1
2bZ + 2b [bZ + c (r + O - (jZ)zr
cp = ----=----~----=-
(r + O _ (jZ)Z
Taking the first derivative of V(X) and inserting into equation (1.6), the
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optimal harvest rule can be expressed as
1
Y'(X) = b (8 + cri X,
and we see that the optimal harvest rate is linear in stock size. By applying
the Kolmogorov forward equation, the steady-state probability distrib-
ution for stock can be found.i Pindyck (1984) also provides two other
examples where he specifies bioeconomic models and derives closed-form
solutions for the optimal harvest policies. These examples, along with the
one presented above, demonstrate, among other things, how an increase
in a(X) can increase, decrease, or leave harvest rates unchanged.
1.3 Applications in Bioeconomics
There has been an extensive development in the application of uncertainty
in bioeconomic models. It is impossible to review all the accomplishments
in this literature but in the following we try to give an overview of some
of the issues that have been dealt with. The topics and papers discussed
in this section are not meant to give a comprehensive overview of the
literature. The purpose is rather to exemplify the range of issues that have
been analysed by use of stochastic bioeconomic modelling.
2See Dixit & Pindyck (1994) for a presentation of the Kolmogorov forward equation
and an excellent introduction to stochastic-diffusion optimal control theory.
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1.3.1 Optimal Harvest from a Fish Stock
In the deterministic setting the analysis of optimal harvesting typically
involves finding the optimal steady-state harvest and biomass level along
with the corresponding optimal approach path from the initial stock level (see
e.g. Clark & Munro, 1975; Clark, 1976).3 In a stochastic fishery there is no
steady state. The system is randomly changing and as a result optimal
harvest must be specified for every state that can possible occur. Instead
of deriving optimal steady-state harvest, the optimal harvest policy, i.e.,
harvest as a function of state, must be found.
In the papers by Reed (1979) and Pindyck (1984) presented in section
1.2, stochastic optimisation was used to derive optimal harvest policies. A
number of papers extend these models and in the following some of them
are discussed.
Lewis (1981) develops a discrete time, Markov model of a fishery.
Whereas Reed (1979) introduced uncertainty to the stock-growth relation-
ship, Lewis analyses the case of uncertain catchability. Lewis further as-
sumes biomass can be described by a finite number of states represented
by possible stock sizes. Population dynamics in Lewis (1981) are given by
Xt+1 = Xt + G (Xt) - T/taXtKt, where G(Xt) is a logistic growth function, and
T/taXtKt is a production function giving catch in period t. Uncertainty is
3It is common to make the assumptions that (i) stock growth is concave in stock and
(ii) the objective function is concave inharvest. If assumption (ii) is relaxed, continuous
harvesting strategies may be outperformed by other harvesting policies (see e.g. Lewis &
Schmalensee, 1977).
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introduced by letting 'lt be a uniformly distributed random variable with
mean one. Markov transition probabilities of moving from one state to
another is calculated and used to obtain the optimal solution through dy-
namic programming. The optimal strategy is seen to be a function of stock
size (state), which is revealed to the fishery manager each period prior to
decision making. Optimal strategies are derived for three different cost
specifications: zero costs, and increasing and decreasing marginal costs
of effort. While a deterministic analysis is found to provide a good ap-
proximation to stochastic analysis in the case of increasing marginal costs,
deterministic harvest rules are poor substitutes for the optimal stochastic
strategies when costs are decreasing in effort or zero.
Spulber (1982) extends the Reed (1979) model by letting the environ-
mental disturbances follow a general Markov process, i.e., Zt+1 = cp (·Izt),
where cp (-) is a probability distribution, and by assuming, like Reed (1974),
that fishing firms face a fixed set-up cost of harvesting L. Spulber proves
that the optimal harvest policy in this case is given by:
Yt={ (Xt-S(Zt» if Xt>S(Zt)
O if x, s S(Zt)
where S (z) ~ s (z) (S (z) = s (z) if L = O). The optimal harvest rule is
similar to that of Reed (1979) with some important distinctions. First,
optimal escapement depends on the expected stock-recruitment as given
by the value of the random variable z. Second, the the net revenues from
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harvesting must cover the setup cost and if harvests cannot be large enough
to cover setup costs, it is optimal for the fishing fleet to be inactive. For
this reason [S (z) - s (z)] increases with L from zero when L = O.The model
reduces to the Reed model if Zt+l are lid and L = O.Spulber (1982) also
evaluates the stability of the harvest policy and finds that there exists a
stable equilibrium probability distribution for the stock, independent of
the previous stock and the environmental shock. He shows that pulse-
fishing policies are optimal within this framework.
In the Reed (1979) model, stock-recruitment is stochastic. Shocks are
assumed to occur after harvesting in one period and before next period's
recruitment. Before deciding how much to harvest, one knows the exact
size of the stock with certainty. In most real-world fisheries, estimates
of stock size are not perfect. Clark & Kirkwood (1986) deal with this by
modelling a fishery using a framework similar to Reed's but where the
uncertainty is revealed after the harvest level has been determined. They
thus assume that Xt+1 in equation (1.1) is a random variable with a given
probability distribution dependent upon the known escapement level St.
Using this specification, Clark and Kirkwood show that the optimal harvest
policy is not a constant escapement policy as in the original Reed model.
The optimal policy in Clark and Kirkwood's model can however only be
approximated numerically.
Sandal & Steinshamn (1997) extend the Pindyck (1984) model by as-
suming nonlinearity in the control variable Y. Instantaneous net revenues
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are then given by TI(X,Y) = p(Y)Y - c(X, Y), where p(Y) is the linear down-
ward sloping demand curve and c(X, Y) is a cost function increasing in
Y. As in Pindyck, Sandal and Steinshamn seek to find the harvest rate
that maximises the present value of net revenues subject to the dynamic
constraint given by equation (1.2). By applying perturbation methods they
derive approximate expressions for optimal feedback policies, i.e., harvest
rate as a function of stock size, under various assumptions.
Many other papers analyse optimal harvesting of a stock with stochas-
tic stock growth. Lungu & Øksendal (1997) analyse what harvest policy
maximises discounted harvest from a stock evolving according to the sto-
chastic logistic equation dX = X(l - f)(rdt + adz) - Y, which is slightly
different from the stock dynamics equation (1.2) of Pindyck (1984). They
show that optimal harvesting in this case is a constant escapement pol-
icy. By maximising discouted harvest they ignore harvesting costs. See
e.g. Alvarez & Shepp (1998), Alvarez (2001), and Framstad (2003) for ex-
tensions of the analysis in Lungu & Øksendal (1997) and for alternative
model specifications.
Sethi et aL (2005) develop a discrete model with three sources of un-
certainty incorporated: growth, stock measurement, and harvest quota
implementation. Stochastic stock growth follows Reed (1979) and is given
by equation (1.1). Stock measurement and actual harvest are given by
x:: = Z~Xtand Yt = min(Xt, z~Yi), respectively, where z~ and z~are random
variables, and Yl is the harvest quota. The authors are able to numerically
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approximate the optimal policy of the problem of maximising expected
present value of the fishery over an infinite horizon. They analyse how the
optimal policy change when one of the uncertainty sources are high while
the others are low. If the growth or implementation uncertainties are high,
the optimal policies are not qualitatively different from Reed's constant
escapement policy. With high measurement uncertainty however, Sethi
et aL (2005) find that the optimal policy changes significantly. Compared
to the optimal constant escapement policy (Reed, 1979), the optimal policy
is seen to lower the risk of extinction.
Optimal harvesting has also been studied under price uncertainty. One
example is Hanson & Ryan (1998)who study optimal harves ting from a fish
stock subject to price and stock uncertainty. They find, not surprisingly,
that price fluctuations have a big impact on the value of the fishery, but
only a modest impact on the optimal harvest policy.
Costello et al. (1998) and Costello et aL (2001) analyse optimal har-
vesting under environmental stock uncertainty and study the value of
environmental prediction and how prediction changes optimal harvest.
The studies find the effect on current harvest policy (and forecast value) of
predictions beyond a one-year forecast to be modest or non-existent.
1.3.2 Relative Efficiency of Management Instruments
The question of taxes versus quotas in renewable resource management
has been considered by several authors throughout the years. In a deter-
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ministic setting the two are equally good, but this might no longer be the
case when uncertainty is introduced to the model. The efficiency of other
management instruments has also been analysed and compared. In the
following we review some of the literature dealing with the relative effect
of fisheries management instruments.
The classic paper on "prices vs. quantities" is Weitzman (1974). Koenig
(1984a,b) follows along the lines of Weitzman (1974) and evaluates benefits
and costs associated with different management instruments in a stochastic
discrete-time model. He makes several simplifying assumptions to be able
to solve the dynamic programming problem, including the assumption of
a linear growth relationship: Xt+l = cpo + CPl (X, - Yt) + z., where cpo and CPl
are constants, and z; is a zero-mean random variable. Both cost and benefit
functions are quadratic and uncertainty is included by adding random
disturbances to the linear terms. Koenig's cost and benefit functions are
respectively
n(Yt)
where bo, bl, Co,Cl, and C2 are positive constants, and 'It and Yt are random
variables with mean zero. If there is no measurement error in the stock
estimates (z = O),Koenig shows that taxes are at least as efficient as quotas
and strictly better in the presence of demand or supply uncertainty. If
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stock size is observable only with error, harvest quotas can outperform
landing taxes depending on the relative elasticities of market supply and
demand (Koenig, 1984b). In a recent paper, Jensen & Vestergaard (2003)
discuss conditions for applying the results of Weitzman (1974) to fisheries.
Androkovich & Stollery (1991) use a model very similar to Koenig's but
with a slightly different treatment of risk. While Koenig assumes harvest
decisions are made with full information whereas tax rates are set with
incomplete information, Androkovich & Stollery (1991) assume that both
decisions regarding tax rates and whether to harvest are taken before the
realisation of the random variables. Using this slightly different model
formulation they find that a landing tax is always superior to harvest
quotas.
Yet another analysis of taxes versus quotas is Anderson (1986). His
approach differs from the studies presented above in that he combines
discrete-time and continuous-time bioeconomic models. Regulatory deci-
sions are made at discrete time steps, whereas fishing and stock dynamics
are modelled in continuous time. Anderson (1986) finds that neither taxes
nor quotas are generally superior; the optimal policy depends on the char-
acteristics of the specific fishery.
Mirman & Spulber (1985) analyse fishery regulations under harvest
uncertainty in a discrete model. Compared to the Reed (1979) model there
are several similarities, but Mirman and Spulber make some additional
assumptions. As in the Reed model, the fishery regulator has perfect in-
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formation on the size of the stock and makes regulatory decisions after
observing last period's growth but before knowing next period's growth.
In contrast to the Reed model, Mirman and Spulber assume the individ-
ual fishing firm does not necessarily know the current fish stock. The
yield-effort relationship is therefore uncertain. They show that with yield-
effort uncertainty, both taxes on landings and vessel quotas might have
unintended and unfortunate effects. A landings tax can be used to reg-
ulate effort optimally but with harvest levels exceeding optimal harvest,
whereas a vessel quota limits harvest to the optimal level but with ex-
cessive effort. Mirman and Spulber suggest applying taxes and quotas
together and they show how this combination induces the fishing firms to
choose optimal effort and optimal harvest levels.
In a recent paper, Weitzman (2002) specifies a discrete-time model sim-
ilar to Clark & Kirkwood (1986) by assuming regulatory decisions are
made before the recruitment level is known. He uses his model to com-
pare two management instruments, a unit landing fee and catch quotas,
and he draws the conclusion that the landing fee is always superior to
catch quotas. His conclusion is therefore the same as that of Androkovich
& Stollery (1991). The conclusion is perhaps not surprising given that
Weitzman' s model includes environmental uncertainty but no economic
uncertainty and therefore favours the landing tax. Weitzman's analysis, or
perhaps rather his conclusions, has triggered renewed interest in studies
of landings taxes versus harvest quotas (e.g. Hannesson &Kennedy, 2005).
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We have seen several examples of stochastic bioeconomic models be-
ing used to evaluate the relative performance of landings taxes to catch
quotas. These studies do however not give an unambiguous answer. To
prove analytically that one instrument is superior to the other, one has to
make several rather restrictive assumptions. The work on the subject has
therefore given us conditions for when an instrument is superior to the
other rather than a general conclusion of superiority.
The relative efficiency of other management instruments has also been
studied in the literature. Hannesson & Steinshamn (1991) use a one-period
model to compare a constant harvest rule to a constant effort rule when
faced with a stochastically varying stock. If the revenue function is con-
cave, a constant catch quota equal to the expected harvest of a constant
effort rule is shown to yield a higher average income than the constant
effort rule. If harvest is a function of stock and effort and concave with
respect to stock size, a constant catch rule gives higher average costs. Han-
nesson and Steinshamn therefore conclude that neither rule is superior; it
depends on the sensitivity of CPUE to changes in stock. Quiggin (1992)
extends Hannesson and Steinshamn's analysis by deriving conditions for
superiority of constant effort rules to constant catch rules. As Hannesson &
Steinshamn (1991), Quiggin (1992) uses a one-period model in his analysis.
Danielsson (2002) further extends the analysis of relative efficiency of
catch quotas to effort quotas by including stock dynamics with uncertain
stock growth and stochastic variations in the CPUE. By including stock
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dynamics, the effect of the present period's harvest on next period's stock
size is taken into account. Danielsson's model is to some extent related
to the Reed (1979) model but with some exceptions. Instead of equation
(1.1) stock dynamics are explained by Xt+1 = St +!(Xt,et), where et is a ran-
dom variable representing uncertainty in stock growth. Danielsson uses a
production function of the form Y, = H (Kt, Xt + !(Xt, et), Tlt), where Tlt is a
random variable reflecting variations in CPUE independent of stock size.
In addition, Danielsson allows for measurement error in stock estimates
by letting X, = m (X~, et), where X~ is measured stock size, and et is a
random variable possibly correlated with Tlt. Maximised expected present
value of net benefits from the fishery, where benefits (utility or profits) are
expressed as a function of stock size and fishing effort, are derived both
for catch quotas and for effort quotas. Based on this, Danielsson derives
sufficient conditions for situations when management with catch quotas is
superior to management with effort quotas and vice versa.
Herrera (2005) analyse the relative efficiency of different management
instruments focusing on bycatch and discarding. He develops a two-
stock model of an input regulated fishery with stochastic bycatch. He
evaluates the relative efficiency of four regimes: price instruments, trip-
based value and quantity limits, and no output regulations. He concludes
that price instruments (taxes or subsidies) are more efficient than the trip-
based quotas he analyse, namely value and quantity limits. Comparing
trip-based quotas, value limits are found to give better results than quantity
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limits, as they eliminate some of the incentives to discard.
Marine protected areas have recently received widespread attention
as a management instrument that recognises the importance of spatial
processes in the bioeconomic system. Marine reserves and spatial mod-
elling of fish stocks will be discussed in section 1.3.5.
1.3.3 Management of Shared Fish Stocks
Stochastic modelling can contribute to the understanding of game theo-
retical aspects of the management of shared fish stocks. Information or
believes on the sources and magnitude of variation may vary between the
players. Itmay also be in the players' interest to conceal information from
one another. Uncertainty might therefore, inter alia, destabilise otherwise
satisfactory sharing agreements. An important part of the bioeconomics
literature deals with the management of transboundary fish stocks. There
are however very few studies that incorporate uncertainty. One exception
is the application of stochastic game theory to the management of fisheries
by Kaitala (1993). Another exception is the recent study by Laukkanen
(2003), who establishes a model of a sequential fishery based on the Reed
(1979) model. Laukkanen's model is as follows. A fish stock is assumed
to migrate between two areas, a feeding area and a breeding area. Two
agents harvest the stock. Agent 2 operates in the breeding area and his
initial stock is the observed escapement from the feeding area where Agent
1 operates. Agent 2 determines his harvest level based on the observed
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initial stock level in the breeding area. Before the stock migrates back to
the feeding area, the stock grows stochastically according to equation (1.1).
Agent 1 observes the initial stock migrating to the feeding area and decides
how much to harvest. What he does not know is the escapement from the
breeding area, Le., the stock left unharvested by agent 2 before recruit-
ment. In contrast, agent 2 has full information on agent l's escapement
leveL Laukkanen assumes risk neutral agents who seek to maximise prof-
its. Harvest is explained by the Schaefer production function (Y = qEX).
Both cooperative and non-cooperative harvest policies are analysed within
this framework and Laukkanen is able to derive conditions under which
cooperation is sustained as a self-enforcing equilibrium.
Considering that much attention has been focussed on international
management of shared fish stocks in the fisheries economics literature, it
is somewhat surprising that so few have incorporated uncertainty in their
models.
1.3.4 The Risk of Biomass Collapse
One strand of the literature deals with the risk of stock collapse. Similar
analyses of the effects of catastrophic risks can be found in the forestry
literature, e.g. Reed (1984) who considers the effects of the risk of fire on
the optimal rotation period of a strand of trees. Returning to the bioe-
conomic literature, Clemhout & Wan (1985) study a renewable resource
under the random threat of extinction. The model is in continuous time
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and the instantaneous probability of extinction is decreasing in stock size.
Clemhout and Wan model individual fishing firms' harvesting from the
stock in a game theoretical framework and study both cooperative and
non-cooperative stationary solutions. A stationary solution is defined as
a situation with constant stock and harvest rates until the time of sud-
den resource extinction. Stationary solutions are derived analytically and
show that the stationary cooperative stock is larger than the stationary
non-cooperative stock. Consequently, cooperation increases the survival
prospect of the resource.
Amundsen & Bjørndal (1999) develop a model where the biomass
collapse is due to exogenous factors. This is similar to what is referred to as
'environmental collapse' in an earlier study by Johnston & Sutinen (1996).
The probability of collapse, provided that it has not already occurred, is
assumed constant as time goes by and the size of the collapse is assumed
to be a known function of the stock size prior to collapse. Amundsen and
Bjørndal find that the optimal stock can be above, equal to, or below the
no-collapse stock, depending on the size of the collapse and the failure
rate. When harvest costs and the size of the collapse are independent of
stock size, it is shown that the optimal pre-collapse stock is larger than the
optimal no-collapse stock. If, instead, the collapse is a given percentage of
the total stock, the optimal stock is always below the optimal no-collapse
stock.
Bulte & van Kooten (2001) develop a bioeconomic model with stochas-
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tic stock growth and risk of downward shifts in stock caused by catastro-
phes, which are modelled as a Poisson jump process. They use their model
to analyse the concept of minimum viable population size.
Several studies analyse sustainable harvesting where the risk of extinc-
tion typically is minimised given certain conditions, e.g. maximisation of
discounted rents or annual yields. Ludwig (1995) models stock dynamics
in a similar manner to Bulte & van Kooten (2001) and analyses the concept
of sustainability. InLudwig (1998) he continues the work on stocks under
the threat of collapse, this time focusing on optimal management.'
1.3.5 Spatial Bioeconomic Models and Marine Reserves
Lately, spatial bioeconomic models have been given increased attention by
fisheries economists and others, and the focus has in particular been on the
study of marine reserves or marine protected areas. Deterministic models
of marine reserves have shown that they, if anything, reduce the value of
fisheries when harvest can be set optimally. Also stochastic bioeconomic
models have been used to analyse the effects of marine reserves. One of
the early rationales for marine reserves was the view by Lauck et al. (1998)
that marine fisheries confront managers with "irreducible uncertainty;"
i.e., uncertainty that cannot be further reduced with more information or
predictive models, and that in the face of irreducible uncertainty, no-fishing
4See also the work by Engen, Lande and Sæther on sustainable harvesting of stochastic
stocks under the risk of resource collapse (Lande et al., 1994, 1995, 1997; Engen et al., 1997;
Sæther et aL, 1996).
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zones might be the best strategy. The cornmon opinion in the fisheries
economics literature is that protecting the source by establishing a marine
reserve is effective in the case of sink-source systems (for a definition see
e.g. Sanchirico & Wilen, 1999), where young individuals are found in one
area ('source') before migrating to other areas ('sinks'). In most other cases
however, no unambiguous conclusions have been reached.
Sumaila (1998) develops a discrete time, bioeconomic model of the
Barents Sea cod fishery and analyses the optimal size of a marine reserve
when a large shock is introduced to the system. The analysis is done by
adding the occurrence of a large negative shock in stock recruitment from
the fishing area, to an otherwise deterministic model. Seeking to maximise
discounted net revenues from the fishery, numerical methods are used to
approximate the solution of the problem. In Sumaila (2002), the work is
extended by assuming that two vessel groups participate in the fishery.
It is analysed how marine reserves affects the payoffs of the two players
under cooperative and competitive management. In both studies, Sumaila
concludes that marine reserves represent effective protection against dra-
matic, negative shocks. This is in line with Lauck et al. (1998), who also
consider irreducible or true uncertainty.
Several authors suggest marine reserves to secure the biomass at a
sustainable level in the presence of harvest uncertainty (e.g. Mangel, 1998;
Doyen & Bene, 2003).
Hannesson (2002) develops a continuous-time model of two patchy
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populations, neither being a source or a sink. The growth equation (1.2)
is modified to describe growth in two interdependent sub-stocks. If the
fishery is unregulated (open access), closing off one area is seen to reduce
the variability of the catch and increase the total population. However,
Hannesson finds no increase in expected rents from protecting one sub-
population. While Hannesson considers the effects of marine reserves
with open access elsewhere, Conrad (1999) analyses the effects of marine
reserves under the assumption of a total allowable catch given by a linear
policy in the open area (i.e., total allowable catch is a constant share of
the stock size in the open area). Conrad's model is in discrete time and
incorporates uncertainty in a manner similar to Reed (1979). His analysis
shows how the variability in biomass is reduced when an area is closed off.
Grafton et al. (2004) develop a model of an uncertain fishery, where
two sources of uncertainty are incorporated. Environmental variability is
modelled as a Wiener process and the possibility of a negative shock is
included as a Poisson process. The model is used to analyse the value
of a marine reserve when harvesting is optimal. Net economic return is
maximised over harvest and reserve size. They find that marine reserves
generate values that cannot be obtained through optimal choice of harvest
and effort levels alone."
Bulte & van Kooten (1999) analyse optimal harvesting of a stock con-
5See Grafton & Kompas (2005) for a presentation of this and other studies on marine
reserves and uncertainty.
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sisting of two local subpopulations. Stock growth is stochastic in both
subpopulations and the analysis is done in a continuous-time framework
similar to Hannesson (2002). Instead of protecting one area, they consider
the possibility of managing the two subpopulations independently. Using
stochastic optimisa tion, they derive expressions for optimal harvest in each
area and find that total harvest might increase or decrease compared to to-
tal harvest when treating the subpopulations as one stock. By managing
the subpopulations independently, the fishery manager can take advan-
tage of migration by choosing local harvest rates and thereby increase
total harvest. Furthermore, if stock-growth in the two subpopulations is
dependent, the manager can hedge against risk.
In a recent work by Costello & Polasky (2005), a spatial, discrete time
model of a fishery is developed, in which four sources of uncertainty is
incorporated. All sources of uncertainty are biological: (i) stochastic spatial
dispersal, and random environmental shocks to (ii) production of young,
(iii) survival of adults, and to (iv) survival of settlers. Using dynamic
programming they manage to derive an interior solution to the fishery's
rent maximisation problem. The existence of an interior solution implies
that the harvest rate in each fishing area is positive and that no area should
be closed. The problem is found to have an interior solution if the stock size
in every patch is sufficiently large. The paper also considers conditions for
corner solutions, which mean that an area closure is optimal, and concludes
that marine reserves can be optimal "under a number of different, and
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realistic, bioeconomic conditions."
Whereas most studies discussed thus far have been optimisation analy-
ses, there is a significant literature on behavioural models of fisheries. Dis-
crete choice models have been used to predict fisherman behaviour and
an often-sited reference in the fisheries literature is Bockstael & Opaluch
(1983), who analyse seasonal gear choice and target species. The key ele-
ment of discrete choice models is that individual choice is driven by utility,
where utility is assumed to consist of a deterministic part and a random
component. The models further allows for heterogeneity among individ-
uals. Discrete choice or random utility modelling can be used to describe
spatial behaviour, e.g. choice of fishing ground, and is therefore very suit-
able for analysis of marine reserves as a management instrument or spatial
management of fish stocks in general.
Smith & Wilen (2003) link a spatial behavioural model to a biological
model of the northern California red sea urchin fishery and analyse how
rent will be spatially dissipated by mobile divers in the fishery. The spatial
behaviour of the divers is modelled and estimated in a repeated nested
logit framework, where daily discrete participation and choice of fishing
location are modelled jointly. The estimated model shows that fishermen
adjust to spatial differences in expected returns. Based on the nested
logit estimates, Smith and Wilen calculate cross-revenue elasticities, which
show how changes in expected revenues in one fishing area, or "patch,"
affects effort employed per area. The biological model represents the sea
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urchin population as a metapopulation consisting of eleven fishing areas
linked with a dispersal matrix. The implications of spatial closures are
analysed by simulating the integrated model with and without a closure
of one of the patches. The authors find that accounting for fishermen's
spatial behaviour offsets the harvest gains from marine reserves in the
sea urchin fishery and concludes that optimistic results obtained about
reserves may be due to simplifying assumptions that ignore economic
behaviour. In Smith & Wilen (2004) they extend the analysis by letting
the choice of fisher home port be endogenous and thereby allowing for
simulation ofboth short and long run diver behaviour. Although allowing
for port switching has some new implications for the predictions made,
the main conclusion remains the same, namely that traditional analysis of
marine reserves as a management instrument might be biased in favour
of reserves because of oversimplified assumptions made about fisherman
behaviour.
1.3.6 Other Issues
The literature deals with several issues beyond those covered in this review.
A number of papers examine uncertainty in multi-cohort and multi-species
models (e.g. Mendelssohn, 1978, 1980; Spulber, 1983; Reed, 1983;Kennedy,
1989). These models are similar to the single-cohort, single-species models
discussed above although the inclusion of additional cohorts and/or species
adds to the complexity of the models.
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Extensive research has been done on the issue of investment in capacity
in the fishing fleet. An often-sited reference on this is Charles (1983) who
analyses optimal fleet investment in a stochastic framework. He models
change in biomass in a similar manner to Reed (1979). In addition, the
capital stock (fishing fleet capacity) is assumed to deteriorate over time
and investments, assumed irreversible, are therefore needed if the fishing
effort is to be kept up. Using dynamic optimisation, Charles determines
optimal policy functions for both fleet investment and stock escapement.
Numerical approximations are used to find the optimal policies.
The literature on other natural resources contains many papers related
to bioeconomic modelling. There is, for instance, an extensive literature
on real options and optimal stopping rules (see e.g. Clarke & Reed, 1990,
for a review), a topic that has not been discussed here but, nevertheless,
can be applied to bioeconomic models.
1.4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have tried to provide an overview of some of the devel-
opment in stochastic bioeconomic modelling since the introduction in the
early 1970s. We live in a stochastic world and have to deal with inaccurate
data and unknown external disturbances in addition to the fundamental
uncertainty of the future, etc. To deal with this, uncertainty has been in-
corporated into bioeconomic models to do normative studies, to analyse
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industry behaviour, and to evaluate alternative management policies.
The methods used in solving stochastic optimisation problems in re-
source management have changed since the introduction. Inthe beginning,
the main focus was on deriving analytic solutions. Gradually, and perhaps
as a result of increased computer power, the use of dynamic programming
and numerical methods has increased. With the powerful computers of
today, numerical methods can be used to approximate solutions to fairly
complex problems - problems that might have been considered unsolvable
just a few years ago.
We have seen how incorporating uncertainty into bioeconomic models
can make the models more realistic, provide additional insights, present
new problems, and suggest solutions that would not appear from a deter-
ministic analysis. However, the introduction of uncertainty to the model
might not be worthwhile although there are underlying random processes
influencing the system. If stochastic analysis does not change the impli-
cations significantly, one should consider whether it is possible to keep
the analysis within a more straightforward deterministic setting, as the
incorporation of uncertainty comes at the cost of increased complexity.
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Abstract
A continuous time, bioeconomic model is developed and used to derive
supply curves for the open-access and the optimally managed fisheries.
Supply curves are estimated based on data for the North Sea herring fishery.
Different regulatory regimes in the fishery over the past two decades, both
actual and theoretical, are evaluated with respect to effects on supply, stock
level, and fishing effort. The results indicate that different regulations can
have a substantial impact on the supply of North Sea herring. It is argued
that the annual equilibrium supply can vary from zero in case the stock
is driven to extinction under open access, to a sustainable annual yield of
690-700,000 tonnes.
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2.1 Introduction
Market analysis is based on supply and demand. While demand func-
tions and market structure receive substantial attention in the fisheries
economic literature, very little attention is given to the supply side in fish-
eries. The backward-bending open-access supply curve was derived in
the seminal paper by Copes (1970). With the advent of optimal control
theory, Clark (1990) derived the equilibrium supply curve for an optimally
managed fishery. However, the literature contains few, if any, empirical
studies of fisheries supply curves. Bjørndal (1987) estimated a harvest sup-
ply function, but the purpose of his study was to use duality to retrieve the
characteristics of the underlying production technology, and the supply
function per se was not derived.
The purpose of this paper is to derive and estimate supply functions for
the North Sea herring fishery. A bioeconomic model will be developed and
used to derive supply curves for the open-access regime and the optimally
managed fishery. These supply curves are then empirically estimated
based on data for the fishery. Thus, the paper represents an empirical
application of fisheries supply curves under different regulatory regimes.
With the exception of Copes (1970) and Clark (1990), supply functions
for fish have received little attention in the literature. This is strange for a
number of reasons. Infisheries, as in other sectors of the economy, observed
price and quantity figures will be a result of the interaction between supply
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and demand, as well as government regulations. In such a context, it is
important to identify and attempt to quantify the impact of the supply
side.
A possible reason for this neglect of the supply side is that, in most
bioeconomic models, price is assumed to be fixed. Often, this assumption
is made to simplify an analysis of optimal resource management. In our
analysis, we want to analyse and quantify how the supply of fish varies
with price under different assumptions. Knowledge about the supply
function is important with respect to analysis of the fishery under opti-
mal management, open access, and other regulatory regimes. From the
perspective of market analysis, knowledge about the supply function is
essential. Furthermore, it may help explain the past development of a
fishery like the North Sea herring.
In the next section, the herring fishery is presented, a bioeconomic
model for the fishery is developed, and equilibrium supply curves are
derived. The derived supply curves will be estimated in section 2.3. Section
2.4 contains an analysis of different regulatory regimes in the North Sea
herring fishery over the past two decades. The paper is summarised in the
final section.
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2.2 The Bioeconomic Model
2.2.1 The Herring Fishery
The North Sea autumn spawning herring (Clupea harengus) is a pelagic
stock that lives on plankton. The stock consists of three spawning stocks
with different spawning grounds: the northern, central, and southern
North Sea.
Herring of the central and northern populations spawn in August and
September in the western North Sea. After spawning, the herring migrate
eastwards to spend the winter in the Norwegian Trench. In spring, the
fish migrate north along the Norwegian Trench and then west towards
Shetland. InMay-June, the feeding starts in the northern part of the North
Sea. The southern population spawn in December and January in the
eastern English Channel. After spending the winter in the southern part
of the North Sea, the herring migrate directly to the feeding grounds in
the central and northern North Sea. It is normal to treat the three stocks as
one because they mix on the feeding grounds, rendering it impossible to
distinguish between catches from the different stocks. The herring fishery
takes place primarily in the central and northern North Sea during May to
September.
The North Sea herring stock was severely depleted in the 1960s and
1970s due to overfishing under an open-access regime combined with the
development of very effective fish finding technology (Bjørndal, 1988).
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In 1977, the fishery was closed to allow the stock to recover. Since the
moratorium was lifted, regulations have been in effect. However, in the
mid-1990s the stock once again was below safe biologicallimits, and in 1996
the total quota was reduced to save the stock from collapse. To rebuild
the stock, the quotas have been relatively small since 1996. Recent stock
estimates show that it has been rebuilt above the level that guarantees good
recruitment (ICES, 2002a).
After the introduction of extended fisheries jurisdiction (EFJ), the North
Sea herring has been considered a common resource between Norway and
the European Union (EU). Management decisions are therefore agreed
upon by Norway and the EU. In December 1997, the parties agreed on a
management scheme for the stock, the EU-Norway agreement, specifying
stock objectives and how to set catch quotas (Anon., 2001). This agreement
has been in force since 1January 1998. According to the EU-Norway agree-
ment, the total quota for the directed fishery shall be allocated between the
two parties with 29% to Norway and 71% to the EU. In addition, the EU
gets the entire bycatch quota.i
2.2.2 The Bioeconomic Model
The biomass of a fish stock changes over time due to recruitment, natural
growth, natural mortality, and harvesting. This can be explained by the
2See Bjørndal & Lindroos (2004) on the sharing of the resource between Norway and
the EU.
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following equation:
x = F(X) - H(·), (2.1)
where X = X(t) is the total biomass at time t, F(X) is natural growth of the
biomass, and HO is a production function explaining total catch at time t.
The natural growth of the biomass will be explained by the logistic growth
function
(2.2)
where r is the intrinsic growth rate and L is the carrying capacity of the
environment.
Harvest at time t (or harvest rate) is given by the following Cobb-
Douglas production function:
(2.3)
where K = K(t) is fishing effort at time t. According to Bjørndal & Conrad
(1987), the number of participating vessels may be an appropriate measure
of effort, an assumption that will be made in this study.
The standard Schaefer production function is a special case of equation
(2.3), where b = g = 1. The schooling behaviour of the herring has permit-
ted the development of very effective means of harvesting. With modern
fish finding equipment, harvesting can be viable even at very low stock
levels. For this reason, we expect 1 > g ;::::Ofor herring. The Cobb-Douglas
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production function describes a "pure" schooling fishery where catch is
independent of stock when g = O(Bjørndal, 1988).
We assume the cost per unit effort to be constant. Under this assump-
tion, we can write the cost function as:
1
C(X, Y) = cK = c(a~g)li , (2.4)
where c is the variable cost per vessel per fishing season. The variable cost
will not include costs associated with the crew, because crew remuneration
represents a constant share of the vessel's revenues. We will therefore
adjust the income by a factor that represents the boat owner's share. This
leaves us with the boat owner's share of both prices and variable costs.
We define industry profit as
rr(t) = pH(K,X) - cK = pY - C(X, Y), (2.5)
where p is unit price of harvest. The industry profit equals the resource
rent from the fish stock.
The Open-Access Fishery
The equilibrium in an open-access fishery is known as the bionomic equi-
librium (Gordon, 1954). The conditions for the bionomic equilibrium are:
(i) harvest equal to natural growth; i.e., equation (2.1) is equal to zero,
2.2. The Bioeconomic Model 63
and (li) profits (equation 2.5) equal to zero. From equation (2.5) we obtain
expressions for the open-access stock and effort levels:
(
c )~
X"" = apKb-l
pY
K"" =-c
(2.6)
(2.7)
Hence, we can express the sustained yield Y""in terms of price p and effort
K:
Y"" = rl ~b_l)ll[l-l' l ~b-l)l~l·
paK"" paK""
(2.8)
Equilibrium supply is given by equations (2.7) and (2.8). While it is not
possible to solve for explicit expressions for Y""and Koo unless b = g = 1, it
is possible to solve for Y00 and Koo numerically.
A pure schooling fishery is a special case of the Cobb-Douglas harvest
function with a stock-output elasticity of zero. In this case, the cost of
harvesting is independent of the stock level. Thus, depending on the
price-cost relationship, the fishermen will either increase the fishing effort
until the stock is depleted, or they will not harvest at all. Either way, the
equilibrium supply would be zero. With b = 1 and g = 0, the stock would
be depleted if p > c/a (Bjørndal, 1988).
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The Optimally Managed Fishery
We assume that a sole owner, whose objective is to maximise the present
value of profits from the fishery, manages the fish stock. The present value
of profits is as follows:
00
J = f e-ptn(t)dt,
o
(2.9)
where p is the social rate of discount. The problem is to maximise the
present value of profits subject to equation (2.1). This is an optimal control
problem, where X is the state variable and Y is the control variable. The
maximum principle provides a set of necessary conditions for the opti-
mum. If the profit function n(X, Y) and the dynamic constraint F(X) - Y
are both concave in X and Y, then the necessary conditions are also suffi-
cient. In our model this requires that the effort-output elasticity b is less
than or equal to unity. This will not necessarily hold for the studied fishery.
However, according to Arrow & Kurz (1970) the necessary conditions are
also sufficient if the maximised Hamiltonian of the optimisation problem,
fI'(X(t), it(t), t), is concave in X(t).
The current value Hamiltonian corresponding to the optimisation prob-
lem of maximising the value of J in (2.9), subject to (2.1) is:
_ ( Y )tH = pY - c axg + it (F(X) - Y), (2.10)
where it = it(t) is the co-state variable representing the shadow value of an
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additional unit of fish at time t.
Before continuing, we will prove that the maximum principle provides
sufficient conditions for a solution to the problem. Maximising the Hamil-
tonian (2.10) with respect to harvest rate Y and substituting for Y*gives us
the maximised Hamiltonian
{ (C)~ 1 [(a)b r-fj*=x6 b [a(p-A)]I=b- b ~ (P-A) xi. (2.11)
We only have to show that the maximised Hamiltonian is concave in
X for b > l, as we already know the conditions given by the maximum
principle are sufficient for b ::; 1. Further, if the shadow price of the biomass
A is less than the price p, the optimal policy is Y = O. Inserting Y = Ointo
the Hamiltonian (2.10) gives us a concave function (as F"(X) = -~ < O).
It follows that if the maximised Hamiltonian (2.11) is concave in X for
b > 1 and p ~ A, the maximum principle provides sufficient conditions
for the optimal management problem. By taking the second derivative of
(2.11) with respect to X and doing some algebra, it can be showed that
the maximised Hamiltonian is concave in X for relevant parameter values.
The maximum principle will therefore be used to derive long-run supply
curves for the optimally managed fishery in the following.
By applying the maximum principle, we can derive the following ex-
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plicit expression for price:
1 [ lc Y "5 g 1P = b (axg) X (p - r + 2rX/L) + Y (2.12)
In addition to equation (2.12), the following condition must hold in
equilibrium:
Y = F(X) = rX(l- ~) (2.13)
Using equations (2.12) and (2.13), we can find optimal equilibrium
combinations of price and yield. Clark (1990) refers to the resulting supply
curve as the discounted supply curve.
We also want to find the equilibrium solution for a pure schooling
fishery (g = O). Using the first-order conditions from the optimal control
problem, we find that the optimum is given by:
F'(X) = p (2.14)
As there will be no harvesting if profits are negative, equilibrium supply
in a pure schooling fishery is given by:
{
.1.. (r2 - p2) if
Y' = 4r
O otherwise
1
> c (Y")1iP - y; li" (2.15)
From equation (2.15) we can see that in a pure schooling fishery, the
supply is independent of price and costs, as long as the price-cost ratio is
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above a certain level.
Comparing open access and optimal management, the possibility exists
that the long-run supply from an open-access fishery is zero, which will
be the case if the stock is driven to extinction. Equilibrium supply will be
higher under optimal management than under apen access.
We now turn to the estimation of supply curves.
2.3 Empirical Analysis
The estimating equation for the growth function in equation (2.2) is:3
(2.16)
where {31 = r in equation (2.2) and {32 = -riL. Consequently, the carrying
capacity can be expressed as -{3d{32' The left-hand side of equation (2.16)
represents the natural growth of the stock at time t, given by the sum of
stock change and harvest during the period. The right-hand side is the
logistic growth function. Equation (2.16) is estimated using ordinary least
squares (OLS) based on data from the International Council for the Ex-
ploration of the Sea (ICES) for annual total biomass and landings for the
3 Bjørndal (1988) developed and estimated a delay-difference model of population
dynamics. Bjørndal & Conrad (1987) found that the Schaefer model was a good approxi-
mation of this more complicated model. As will be seen, the statistical fit of the model is
also good.
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period 1981-2001 with results presented in Table 2.1.4 For details on the
estimations, see Nøstbakken (2002). The more general growth function,
Table 2.1: Estimated Growth Functions for North Sea Herring (t-statistics
in parentheses)
OLS IV-l (OLS) IV-2 (OLS)
{31 = r
{32 = -riL
L
Adjusted R2
Durbin Watson
0.526 (4.40)
-9.9ge-08 (-2.54)
5,266,955 (5.62)
0.82
1.61
0.542 (4.50)
-1.0ge-07 (-2.75)
4,991,479
0.82
2.49
0.532 (4.31)
-1.04e-07 (-2.55)
5,135,011
0.80
1.79
Xt+1 - Xt + Yl = {31Xt + {32X~ + Ut, is also estimated to allow us to test if it is
appropriate to use the Gordon-Schaefer growth function. The data set is,
however, too small to give us good estimates of three different parameters.
Consequently, the t-values are very low (see Table 2.2), and the hypothesis
{> = 2 cannot be rejected at the 5% significance level. We therefore use the
Gordon-Schaefer model estimated by OLS. According to the results pre-
Table 2.2: Estimation Results from Nonlinear Least Squares Regression
of a more General Growth Function.
Coefficient t-value
r
L
{>
Adjusted R2
Durbin Watson
0.355
364,831,200
2.479
0.83
0.04
1.58
4Source: Herring Assessment Working Group, ICES (2002a)
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sented in Table 2.1, the intrinsic growth rate of the biomass r is about 0.53
and the carrying capacity of the environment L is about 5,270,000 tonnes.
The estimate of the intrinsic growth rate is very close to the corresponding
estimate reported by Bjørndal (1988) of 0.52, which was based on esti-
mating a delay-difference model of population dynamics. Amason et al.
(2000) report an estimate of the intrinsic growth rate for Norwegian spring
spawning herring of 0.47. Thus, the estimate of the intrinsic growth rate
presented appears to be very robust.
Based on the estimated parameters, the stock level corresponding to
maximum sustainable yield Xmsy is 2,635,000 tonnes, with a corresponding
maximum sustainable yield (MSY) of 698,275 tonnes.
Bjørndal & Conrad (1987) used Norwegian purse seine data for the
period 1963 -1977 to estimate a Cobb-Douglas production function. They
obtained: a = 0.06157, b = 1.3556, and g = 0.5621. The parameter estimates
show that the Schaefer production function is inappropriate for the North
Sea herring fishery. The parameter g reveals, as expected, the output
elasticity of stock size to be between zero and one. Thus, harvest will
decrease with decreasing stock size, but is not very sensitive to changes.
The parameter b indicates an output elasticity of effort larger than one.
This means that increased effort is met with increasing harvest. This may
be the result of economies of scale in the search for schools of herring.
Bjørndal & Conrad (1987) also estimated the production function for a
pure schooling fishery as a special case. With g = Oimposed, they obtained
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the following parameter estimates for the Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion by OLS regression: as = 93.769 and b, = 1.4099. Even if the Cobb
Douglas functional form, Y = aKbXg, resulted in the most plausible values
for the bionomic equilibrium and open-access dynamics (Bjørndal & Con-
rad, 1987), the pure schooling fishery is an interesting case. As pointed
out by Bjørndal (1988) the optimal stock levels under this assumption are
always less than or equal to optimal stock levels with density-dependent
costs.
Several countries harvest the North Sea herring stock. Byestimating
the production function using data from the Norwegian purse seine fleet,
fishing effort K may be interpreted as an estimate of "purse seine equiva-
lents" fishing herring in the entire North Sea (Bjørndal & Conrad, 1987).
The parameters of the production function estimated by Bjørndal & Con-
rad (1987) will be used in the current analysis. Their estimation was for
a time period when the fishery was unregulated, and econometric con-
ditions for estimating a production function were satisfied. This would
not be the case for later periods, due to varying regulations of the fishery.
The implication of using these parameters is that the efficiency of the fleet,
represented by the constant term a,may be somewhat underestimated due
to technological development.
Cost data for the Norwegian purse seine fleet will be used. The Nor-
wegian Directorate of Fisheries annually collects cost data on a sample of
vessels. Cost data for purse seine vessels with cargo capacity 8,000 hec-
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tolitres and above is used in the analysis. Fixed costs are disregarded,
because the vessels in question participate in several seasonal fisheries in
addition to the North Sea herring fishery. This is appropriate, as the North
Sea herring fishery is relatively minor compared to other fisheries and does
not require any special equipment.
The price used is the average price paid to the boat owners for North
Sea herring, adjusted by a factor of 0.65, which represents the boat owner's
share of income. Adjusted prices and relevant costs for the period 1998 to
2000 are shown in Table 2.3. See Nøstbakken (2002) for a more thorough
discussion. All prices and costs are in real 2001 NOK. Table 2.3 shows a
Table 2.3: Price per Tonne, Variable Costs, and the North Sea Herring
Fishery's Share of the Costs, 1998-2000.
Year 1998 1999 2000
Price 1,547 1,210 1,318
Variable costs
Fuel 1,063,687 1,520,629 2,358,402
Bait, ice, salt, and packaging 20,242 254,589 471,606
Miscellaneous 1,575,765 2,522,033 2,137,035
Total variable cost 2,659,694 4,297,251 4,967,042
Number of fishing days 260 250 273
Variable costs per fishing day 10,230 17,189 18,194
Fishing days, North Sea herring 60 60 60
Variable costs, North Sea herring 613,800 1,031,300 1,091,700
Source: Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries (Anon., 1998-2000)
substantial increase in costs from 1998 to 2000. The increase was partic-
ularly large from 1998 to 1999. One explanation is that a relatively large
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number of vessels were replaced that particular year. In addition, the price
of fuel increased considerably during the period.
2.3.1 The Equilibrium Supply Curves
Using the estimated parameters, we are now able to numerically derive
equilibrium supply curves. The open-access equilibrium supply curve for
the east c = 1,091,700, is shown in Figure 2.1. c = 1,091,700 represents
the cost per purse seine vessel in the North Sea herring fishery in 2000
(see Table 2.3). The shape of the curve is backward bending as a conse-
quence of the biological overfishing that occurs when effort exceeds the
level corresponding to MSY (Clark, 1990).
Figure 2.1: The Open-Access Equilibrium Supply Curve, c = 1,091,700
NOK (p in NOK/kg, yield in thousand tonnes).
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The supply is zero if the adjusted price is 495 NOK/tonne or less. The
reason is that fishing is not viable at such low price levels. For prices
above 495 NOK/tonne, the supply increases to the MSY,and subsequently
decreases toward zero again. MSY = 698,275 tonnes is reached when the
price is 544 NOK/tonne. Figure 2.2 shows the equilibrium supply curve
Figure 2.2: The Discounted Supply Curve, c = 1,091,700 NOK, P = 0.06
(black line) and p = O (p in NOK/kg, yield in thousand tonnes).
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for the optimally managed fishery when c = l,09l,700 and alternative
discount rates of 0% and 6%. For p > O, the discounted supply curve is
backward bending, but the degree of backward bending depends on the
rate of discount employed. For small p, the degree of backward bending
will be modest. For p = O, the supply approaches MSY asymptotically as
price increases.
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Similar to the case of open access, the discounted supply will be zero if
the price is 495 NOK/tonne or less. If the discount rate is 6%, supply will
increase with price until pmsy = 1,397 NOK/tonne is reached and the supply
is MSY = 698,275 tonnes. Subsequently, the supply decreases towards a
level of 689,325 tonnes. Thus, even large changes in the price will not affect
the discounted supply very much.
Figure 2.3: Equilibrium Supply Curves for the Optimally Managed Pure
Schooling Fishery, c = 1,091,700 NOK and p = O, P = 0.06, and p = 0.18
(p in NOK/kg, yield in thousand tonnes).
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Figure 2.3 shows equilibrium supply curves for the optimally managed
pure schooling fishery. In this fishery, the equilibrium supply will be zero
if the price is less than 875 NOK/tonne. For prices above 875 NOK/tonne,
the equilibrium supply is positive and independent of price as long as
p :s; r. If p > r, the stoc
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supply will be zero. The equilibrium supply is decreasing in the rate of
discount. For prices above 875 NOK/tonne, the supply is MSY = 698,275
tonnes for p = O and 689,325 tonnes for p = 0.06. The optimally managed,
pure schooling fishery represents limits for the optimal stock leveL
2.3.2 Sensitivity Analysis
The open-access equilibrium supply curve is most sensitive to changes in
the parameters of the production function; especially to changes in the
parameters band g. Changes in costs have a moderate effect on open-
access supply. The supply curves for the optimally managed fishery are
most sensitive to changes in the biological parameters. They are not very
sensitive to changes in the discount rate. The effect of changes in costs on
the discounted supply curve is little. For further details see Nøstbakken
(2002).
2.4 Effects of Regulations
We will now analyse the effect of actual regulations on the supply of North
Sea herring and compare these to the open-access and optimally managed
fisheries. These two cases represent extremes. Very few, if any, real-
world fisheries are under such regimes, but these cases are of interest
as benchmarks for other regulations. The following discussion will be
divided into two periods, before and after 1996, because of an evident
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change in the regulatory regime that year.
2.4.1 Regulations 1981-1996
After a moratorium, the fishery was reopened in the southern North Sea
in 1981 and in the central and northern North Sea in 1983. In 1983, the
total biomass was about 2.7 million tonnes. From 1983 to 1988, there was
a large increase in catches, resulting in a total catch of 888,000 tonnes in
1988 as can be seen in Figure 4. With MSY = 698,275 tonnes, the landings
during the mid-1980s were clearly not sustainable.
Figure 2.4: Equilibrium Supply under Open Access and Optimal
Management/ together with Actual Supply," 1981-1996 (Supply in thou-
sand tonnes). Open Access and Optimal Management Harvests based
on Prevailing Prices and Costs.
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aDiscount rate p = 0,06
bSource: ICES (2002a)
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Based on price and cost data from 1984, we can calculate the equilib-
rium supply and corresponding stock and fishing effort for the optimally
managed and open-access fisheries. The results are shown in Table 2.4. The
optimal stock level is about 2.66 million tonnes. This is approximately the
same as the actual stock level in 1983. To maximise the resource rent from
the stock, one should have harvested 698,200 tonnes per year. Instead,
the stock was gradually reduced below the safe biological level because
of extensive harvesting. Without any regulations in the fishery, the stock
would have been reduced to a level of 575,100 tonnes, with annual catches
of 271,500 tonnes (Table 2.4). Bjørndal & Conrad (1987) use a discrete time
model to analyse the dynamics of an open-access fishery. They argue that
with this model specification there is a greater likelihood of overshooting,
severe depletion, and possible extinction. Thus, there may be depletion
because of overshooting in the open-access case, instead of the stated equi-
librium. Figure 2.4 shows the actual harvest each year from 1981 to 1996
Table 2.4: Equilibrium under Open Access and Optimal Management, p
= 1,151 NOK/tonne and c = 903,000 NOK (Harvest and Stock in Tonnes,
Fishing Effort in Number of Purse Seine Equivalents)
Harvest (Y) Stock (X) Fishing effort (K)
Open-access
Optimal management
271,500 575,100 326
698,200 2,658,900 347
and the harvest each year under optimal management and open access."
5Harvests each year under optimal management and open access are based on the
IN_ Norges Handelshøyskole
Biblioteket
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While annual harvest varies considerably under open access, it is very
stable under optimal management. The actual regulations in the North
Sea herring fishery during this period were not optimal as they did not
maximise rent. However, there were some regulations, distinguishing it
from the open-access regime. Without these regulations, the stock would
probably have been reduced at a faster pace than observed. In this sense,
the regulations prevented the fishermen from catching even more herring,
although the actual catches were far from sustainable. The regulatory
regime might, therefore, best be termed "regulated open access" (Homans
& Wilen, 1997).
2.4.2 Regulations 1996-2002
In May 1996, Norway and the European Union agreed on severe reductions
in total quota to save the North Sea herring stock from collapse. Since 1998
the EU-Norway agreement has been in effect. To rebuild the stock to an
acceptable level, the quotas were relatively small from 1996 to 2002. In
2002, the spawning stock exceeded 1.3 million tonnes, the limit defined by
the EU-Norway agreement.
From 1996 onwards, the quotas agreed on by the EU and Norway have
been set according to recommendations from ICES. For this reason, we also
expect the quotas for 2003 to follow ICES recommendations. In this case,
the TAC for the North Sea area will increase from 265,000 tonnes to 450,000
prevailing prices and costs.
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tonnes in 2003.6 Both prices and costs appear to have changed considerably
Table 2.5: Equilibrium under Open Access and Optimal Management Ac-
cording to Prices and Costs in 1998, 1999, and 2000 (Prices in NOK/tonne,
Costs in NOK, Harvest and Stock in Tonnes, Fishing Effort in Number
of Purse Seine Equivalents).
1998 1999 2000
Price p 1,547 1,210 1,318
Coste 613,800 1,031,300 1,091,700
Open access
Harvest Y 00 95,300 279,800 269,200
Stock x, 186,300 595,100 569,600
Fishing effort K; 240 328 325
Average catch per vessel 397.1 853.0 828.3
Optimal management"
Harvest Y 00 695,700 698,200 698,200
Stock x, 2,475,100 2,667,600 2,656,400
Fishing effort Koo 356 346 347
Average catch per vessel 1,954.2 2,017.9 2,012.1
Actual state
Harvest 380,200 372,300 372,400
Stock 2,189,700 2,464,400 3,118,900
aDiscount rate p = 0.06
bSource: ICES (2002a)
from 1998 to 2000. For this reason, the equilibrium supply will depend on
what year the analysis is based. Table 2.5 shows equilibrium supply and
corresponding stock and fishing effort for the years 1998, 1999, and 2000.
The table also shows the actual harvest and stock level each year.
While the equilibrium supply was quite stable from 1998 to 2000 in the
6ICES Subarea N and Division VIId. Autumn spawning North Sea herring is also
caught in Skagerrak and Kattegat (Division IlIa).
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optimally managed fishery, the opposite is true for the open-access fishery.
Under an open-access regime, the equilibrium supply was 95,000 tonnes
in 1998 and 280,000 tonnes in 1999. As can be seen in Table 2.5, the corre-
sponding stock levels are 186,000 tonnes and 595,000 tonnes. According to
ICES, the minimum biological acceptable level for the North Sea herring
spawning biomass is 800,000 tonnes. With a total biomass of less than
600,000 tonnes, the stock would have been in danger of extinction under
an open-access regime.
If the fishery was optimally managed, the stock would be about 2.6
million tonnes in all three years (Table 2.5). The actual stock level in 2000
was about 3.1 million tonnes. Despite this, the quotas were relatively small
in 2001 and 2002 to let the stock grow even more. According to data for
2000, a stock of 2.66 million tonnes, with a corresponding annual harvest of
698,200 tonnes, would maximise the rent from the stock (Table 2.5). Thus,
annual harvest would be almost as large as the MSY.
For 2000, the optimally managed fishery included a fishing effort of
347 purse seine equivalents in the North Sea herring fishery. This would
allow each purse seine equivalent to harvest about 2,010 tonnes annually,
on average. In 2001, total North Sea herring landings were 364,000 tonnes.
By assuming that each purse seine equivalent catches as much North Sea
herring as the average Norwegian purse seiner, we find that 498 purse
seine equivalents participated in the North Sea herring fishery in 2001.
Thus, actual fishing effort in 2001 was considerably greater than under
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an optimally managed regime. In addition, the total catch was smaller,
resulting in a much smaller average catch per purse seine equivalent in the
actual fishery than in the optimally managed fishery.
The fact that the EU and Norway did not increase TAC in 2001 or 2002,
indicates that they wanted to stabilise the stock at a higher level than what
maximises economic rent. ICES (2002b) gives different catch options for
2003, which reflect both the ICES recommendations and the EU-Norway
agreement. All scenarios result in a spawning stock of 2.2 million tonnes
and a total catch between 620,000 and 635,000 tonnes. If the EU and
Norway continue to follow ICES recommendations, stabilisation with an
annual harvest of about 630,000 tonnes is expected. Using the logistic
growth function from equation (2.2), we estimate the corresponding total
biomass level to be 3.5 million tonnes.
The regulatory regime that has been in force since 1996 appears to result
in a lower supply of North Sea herring than what would have been the case
if the fishery was under optimal management. Because of the shape of the
logistic growth function, moderate stock reductions would have increased
the sustainable yield.
2.4.3 The Effect of the 1996 Change in Regulations
The change in regulations in 1996 seems to have had considerable effects
on both stock level and supply. Before 1996, annual landings were un-
sustainable. This caused the stock to decrease every year, and from 1992
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onwards the stock was smaller than the stock level under optimal man-
agement. After the change in 1996, the stock increased from year to year,
and from 2000 onwards the stock has been larger than the optimal level.
This development is illustrated in Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5: Equilibrium Stock (in thousand tonnes) under Open Access"
and Optimal Management.v'' and Actual Stock,' 1990-2001
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aThe 2001 equilibrium stock is based on costs in 2000.
bDiscount rate p = 0,06
cSource: ICES (2002a)
The change in regulations in 1996 is also evident in Figure 2.6. This
figure shows equilibrium supply under open access and optimal manage-
ment, together with actual supply and calculated sustainable yield based
on actual stock level." The optimally managed fishery results in the highest
supply, while the open-access fishery results in the lowest. The difference
7Sustainable yield YA based on actual stock level XA is calculated as follows: YA =
rXA(1 - XA/L)
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between actual catches and estimated catches based on actual stock lev-
els is relatively large. This is a consequence of the fishery not being in
equilibrium. As expected, the difference is particularly large after 1996.
Figure 2.6: Equilibrium Supply under Open Access" and Optimal
Management/t" together with Actual Supply and Calculated Equilib-
rium Supply Based on Actual Stock Level, 1990-2000 (in thousand
tonnes).
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2.5 Summary
Different regulations can have a substantial impact on the supply of North
Sea herring. It has been argued that the annual equilibrium supply can
vary from zero, in the case where the stock is driven to extinction under
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open access, to a sustainable annual yield of 690-700 thousand tonnes. The
reason for this difference is the effective means of harvesting schooling fish
stocks, which makes the harvesting of herring economically viable even at
very low stock levels.
Inthis paper we have derived and estimated equilibrium supply curves
for the open-access and optimal management fisheries. A sensitivity analy-
sis was subsequently carried out. This analysis showed that the open-
access supply curve was most sensitive to changes in the parameters of
the production function, while the discounted supply curve was most sen-
sitive to changes in the biological parameters. Moderate changes in the
discount rate were found to have little effect on equilibrium supply.
Different regulations, both actual and theoretical, were evaluated with
respect to effects on supply, stock level, and fishing effort. A change in the
actual regulations was evident in 1996. From 1996 onwards, the quotas
have been relatively small. This has allowed the stock to approach a
higher level than what maximises rent. Because of this, the annual supply
is smaller than in an optimally managed fishery. However, the supply
would have been much smaller under an open-access regime.
This paper represents one of the few empirical analyses of supply func-
tions in the literature. The results have been used to gain a better un-
derstanding of the consequences of various regulations of the North Sea
herring fishery. The present analysis could be extended in a number of
ways. One possibility would be to introduce uncertainty in the model of
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population dynamics. Another possibility would be to combine the supply
curves with estimations of demand curves in order to study the market for
North Sea herring.
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Chapter 3
Stochastic Modelling of the North
Sea Herring Fishery under
Alternative Management Regimes
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Abstract
Until1977 the North Sea herring fishery was an open-access fishery. To
save the herring stock from total depletion the fishery was closed from 1977
unti11981. Various regulations have been in effect ever since. In this study,
a discrete-time stochastic bioeconomic model is developed to analyse the
North Sea herring fishery under alternative management regimes. It is
shown how catches and harvest policies change with the price of herring.
Feedback policies are found for the optimally managed fishery. The man-
agement of the North Sea herring after the moratorium was lifted in 1981 is
evaluated. The results indicate that the management has been suboptimal.
Under optimal management the fishery should have stayed closed until
1983. We also find that the current stock is significantly larger than what
maximises net revenues from the fishery.
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3.1 Introduction
In most bioeconomic models, price is assumed fixed. This is a simplify-
ing assumption that is often made when analysing the optimal exploita-
tion of a renewable resource. The aim of this paper is to investigate and
quantify how the harvest quantity of fish varies with price under differ-
ent regulations. Such knowledge is important with respect to analysis of
the fishery under optimal management, open access, and other regula-
tory regimes. Nøstbakken & Bjørndal (2003) derived and estimated supply
curves for the North Sea herring fishery. Apart from this, there are few
empirical applications of supply functions in the literature. In Nøstbakken
and Bjørndal' s analysis, a deterministic bioeconomic model was used.
While the deterministic case offers some useful benchmarks, there are
many sources of uncertainty that influence real-world fisheries. In this pa-
per, a stochastic bioeconomic model will be used to analyse the North Sea
herring fishery under different management regimes. The current analysis
will, to some degree, be an extension of the work in Nøstbakken & Bjørndal
(2003).
Two different production functions will be used to explain harvesting
of North Sea herring. While the analysis will show that the difference
between the two under optimal management is modest, the choice of the
harvest relationship has big implications for the predictions made under
open access. We find that the choice of production function is crucial for
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the outcome of open access in the fishery, although the two production
functions give similar predictions for higher stock levels.
The optimal management ofN orth Sea herring was analysed by Bjørndal
(1987, 1988). His analyses are based on deterministic models of the fish-
ery. By introducing uncertainty into the bioeconomic model, we might get
further insight into the optimal management of a pelagic fishery such as
the North Sea herring fishery. In the stochastic setting, we will find feed-
back policies for the optimally managed fishery. Optimal feedback policies
depend on stock level, but also on the price of herring. In an attempt to
evaluate how efficient the management of the North Sea herring has been
in the past, the optimal feedback policies are applied to the fishery for the
period 1981-200l.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, a
description of the North Sea herring fishery is given, and the bioeconomic
model is presented and estimated. In section 3.3, numerical analyses are
undertaken. The final section summarises and concludes.
3.2 Bioeconomic Model and Empirical Analysis
The first part of this section gives a short overview of the North Sea herring
fishery. The second part presents the bioeconomic model, while parameter
values for the model are estimated in the third part.
3.2. Bioeconomic Model and Empirical Analysis 93
3.2.1 The North Sea Herring Fishery!
The North Sea autumn spawning herring (Clupea harengus) is a pelagic
stock that lives on plankton. The stock was severely depleted in the 1960s
and 1970s due to overfishing under an open-access regime combined with
the development of very effective fish-finding technology (Bjørndal, 1988).
In 1977, the fishery was closed to allow the stock to recover. Since the
moratorium was lifted, regulations have been in effect. Nevertheless, in
the mid-1990s the stock once again was below safe biologicallimits, and
in 1996 the total quota was reduced to save the stock from collapse. To
rebuild the stock, the quotas have been relatively small from 1996 onwards.
Recent stock estimates show that it has been rebuilt above the level that
guarantees good recruitment (ICES, 2003). While the total quota was held
constant from 1999 to 2002, the quota increased with about 40 percent from
2002 to 2003.
After the introduction of extended fisheries jurisdiction, the North Sea
herring has been considered a common resource between Norway and the
European Union (EU). In December 1997, the parties agreed on a manage-
ment scheme for the stock, the EU-Norway agreement, specifying stock
objectives and how to set catch quotas. This agreement has been in force
since 1 January 1998. According to the EU-Norway agreement, the total
quota for the directed fishery shall be allocated among the two parties
with 29% to Norway and 71% to the EU. In addition, the EU gets the entire
lThis section is based on Nøstbakken & Bjørndal (2003).
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bycatch quota.
3.2.2 TheModel
Reed's (1979) stochastic stock-recruitment model is used. This is an ag-
gregated model, and uncertainty is incorporated in a way that makes the
model tractable. The Reed (1979) model can be written as follows:
Xt+1 = Zt+l G(St)
St = Xt - Yt,
(3.1)
(3.2)
where Xt is the total biomass at the beginning of period t, St is escapement,
and Yt is harvest. Zt+l are independent and identically distributed (iid)
random variables with mean one and constant variance, observed at the
beginning of period t + 1. G(St) is a growth function.
Zt+l can be thought of as environmental shocks that occur between last
period's harvest and the current period's recruitment. This means that
after observing the random variable in one period, one knows the current
period' s recruitment level with certainty. The fishery manager can thus set
the quota at the beginning of every period, after the uncertainty has been
revealed. Inmost real-world fisheries, fisheries managers do not know the
exact stock level when setting quotas. Clark & Kirkwood (1986) deal with
this by modelling a fishery in a similar manner to Reed's, but where the
uncertainty is revealed after the harvest level has been determined. Within
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this framework, they show that the optimal harvesting policy is different
from the optimal policy in the Reed model. Weitzman (2002) also uses a
model similar to Reed's, but where regulatory decisions are made before
the period's recruitment is known. He uses his model to compare different
management instruments.
The Reed model seems to give a reasonable representation of the growth
in the North Sea herring stock, as we shall see in the next section where
the empirical analysis is described. However, as we noted above, the Reed
model assumes uncertainty is revealed before harvesting policies are set.
This is a drawback with this model specification, because the managers
do not know the exact level of the North Sea herring stock when setting
quotas. The advantage of using Reed's model is that it is much more
tractable than, for example, a specification similar to Clark & Kirkwood
(1986).
Further, it is assumed that harvest in period t is given by an industry
production function:
(3.3)
This function relates harvest, Yt, to effort, Kt, and stock size, Xt. Ac-
cording to Bjørndal & Conrad (1987b), search for schools is of predominant
importance in a fishery on a schooling species like herring. Thus, in such
fisheries the number of participating vessels may be an appropriate mea-
sure of effort, an assumption that will be made throughout this paper.
96 Chapter 3. Stochastic Modelling of the North Sea Herring Fishery
By assuming a constant cost per unit effort, the net revenue for the
industry can be written as:
(3.4)
where p is the price per unit of harvest and c is the unit cost per vessel per
season.
Production Functions and Optimal Harvest
Two specifications of the aggregate production function in equation (3.3)
will be considered, the Spence (1974) and the Cobb-Douglas production
functions. In this section, these relationships and their optimal feedback
policies are presented.
InReed (1979), the Spence harvest function is used:
(3.5)
where q > Ois a catchability coefficient. We see that Yl ~ XI as Kl ~ 00
and it is thus very difficult to harvest the stock to total extinction within
this model.
The variable cost per unit of fish caught at each point in time can be
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written as:2
Net revenues are thus:
nt = pYt - (c/q)[ln(Xt) -ln(St)]. (3.7)
As Reed (1979) noted, this can be written as an additive separable
function of the state variable X and the control variable S. We then have
n, = N(Xt) - N(St), where N(m) = pm - (c/q)ln(m).
In an optimally regulated fishery, we assume that a sole owner or
a social planner, whose objective is to maximise the expected value of
discounted net revenues from the fishery, manages the fish stock. He faces
the following maximisation problem:
max Eo [t pt IN (Xt) - N (St»)],
(Sd t=O
(3.8)
subject to (3.1), (3.2), and Xo given. p = 1/(1 + b) is the discount factor,
and b is the discount rate. The maximisation problem can be solved using
stochastic dynamic programming. Itcan be shown that the optimal harvest
policy is a constant-escapement policy (Reed, 1979), where the optimal
2Yt = Xt(l - e-qK,) ~ e-qK, = 1 - -xy, = x'x-y, ~ Kt = 1 [ln(Xt) -ln(Xt - Yt)]
" q
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escapement level must maximise the following equation:"
w (S) = pEz [N (zG(S))] - N (S) (3.9)
This equation can be solved numerically for the optimal escapement level
S·. The optimal policy can be expressed as:
(3.10)
Let us now tum to the Cobb-Douglas production function, which can
be expressed as
(3.11)
The parameter a in the relationship represents the efficiency of the fishing
fleet. band g are output elasticities of stock size and effort, respectively.
Because of the herring's schooling behaviour, harvesting can be viable at
very low stock levels and the parameter estimate of g is therefore expected
to be less than one (Bjørndal, 1987).
As opposed to the Spence function, effort does not have to approach
infinity as Yl ~ XI when we use the Cobb-Douglas production function.
It is consequently possible to drive the stock to zero without having an
infinite number of vessels participating in the fishery.
Cost per unit of harvest and net revenues are given by equations (3.12)
3See Conrad (2004) for the derivation of this expression.
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and (3.13):
(3.12)
(
Yt )i
Trt=pYt-C -g
aXt
(3.13)
Inan optimally regulated fishery, the manager would want to maximise
the expected value of discounted net revenues from the fishery. Unfortu-
nately, it is not possible to express net revenues given by equation (3.13)
as a separable function of the state and the control variables. This means
that we do not have a simple way of finding the optimal feedback policy
for the fishery.
As we cannot solve the maximisation problem analytically, we will
instead search for an optimal feedback policy among possible policies.
The feedback policy can be specified in an infinite number of ways and
we do not know the form of the optimal policy. The current analysis will
therefore be restricted to finding the optimal linear feedback policy, given
by the equation
(3.14)
InPindyck' s (1984) continuous-time models, linear feedback policies emerge
in three examples. Our search for optimal linear feedback policies thus
seems fairly reasonable, although there might exist non-linear policies that
would outperform the linear policies.
Harvest in any year can for obvious reasons never exceed the total
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biomass. Inmost fisheries it is also impossible to have a negative harvest.
We therefore add the restriction O ::::;Yl ::::;XI, that must hold for all t.
The upper boundary condition for Yl is not expected to be binding, since
total extinction of a fish stock with an intrinsic growth rate as high as the
herring's is very seldom optimal. With these restrictions on Yl, we are
searching for a feedback policy which is not strictly linear.
Vessel Dynamics
In accordance with Gordon (1954), it will be assumed that vessel entry and
exit under open access follows the sign and size of net revenues per vessel.
Fleet dynamics are assumed to occur according to the following equation:
(3.15)
where n > O is an adjustment parameter. If net revenues per vessel are
positive, effort will increase. If net revenues per vessel are negative, effort
will decrease."
In the optimally regulated fishery, we assume that the optimal number
of vessels participate in the fishery every period. Consequently, there will
be no transition period if the optimal number of vessels changes from
one season to the next. This is a simplifying assumption implying that
4This is perhaps a naive assumption considering the large literature on fisherman
behaviour, including entry and exit decisions in fisheries (see e.g. Bockstael & Opaluch,
1983; Ward & Sutinen, 1994).
3.2. Bioeconomic Model and Empirical Analysis 101
vessels becoming redundant in the North Sea herring fishery immediately
is needed and employed in other fisheries. The question of optimal fleet
size is more complicated and calls for a joint analysis of all fisheries in
which the fishing fleet participates. Nevertheless, being relatively minor
compared to other fisheries, the North Sea herring fishery's influence on
optimal fleet size is modest.
3.2.3 Empirical Analysis
The empirical content of the model consists of the specification and esti-
mation of the stock-recruitment function, and of the production and cost
functions.
Stock-Recruitment Function
A specification of stock-recruitment corresponding to the deterministic
part of equation (3.1) is given by the following logistic function:
( rSt)Xt+l = G(St) = St 1+ r - L ' (3.16)
where r and L represent the intrinsic growth rate and carrying capacity of
the stock, respectively (Clark, 1990). This equation was estimated by ordi-
nary least squares using annual data on total biomass and harvest for the
North Sea herring for the period 1960-2002 obtained from the International
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Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES).5 Parameter estimates are
presented in Table 3.1. The Durbin-Watson statistic given in the Table 3.1
Table 3.1: Estimates of the Parameters of the Stock-Recruitment Function.
Parameter Estimated coefficient Standard Error
OLS
r 0.432 0.075
L 6,677,528 1,549,772
Adjusted R2 0.988
Durbin Watson 1.319
OLS-Auto
r 0.462 0.093
L 5,713,479 1,168,269
Adjusted R2 0.979
Durbin Watson 2.060
p 0.298
indicates that first-order autocorrelation might be a problem, since the test
rejects the null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation. The Breusch-
Godfrey Lagrange multiplier test of autocorrelation of order P was used
to test the logistic equation for autocorrelation of order PE [1,5]. The null
hypothesis of no autocorrelation was rejected for P = 1 (5% significance
level). For P > 1, the null hypothesis could not be rejected.
Table 3.1 also presents the regression results from estimating the logistic
function using the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation to correct for first-order
autocorrelation. After the correction, the point estimate of the carrying ca-
5The Gompertz and Ricker functional forms were also estimated. However, the logistic
function resulted in the best fit and was therefore preferred.
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pacity is smaller while the estimated growth rate is nearly unchanged.
The Durbin Watson test statistic implies that there is no first-order auto-
correlation after the transformation. In the remainder of the paper, we use
parameter estimates corrected for autocorrelation.
According to the regression results, the intrinsic growth rate of the
biomass is r = 0.46 and the carrying capacity of the environment is L =
5,713,480 tonnes. The escapement level that maximises annual sustainable
harvest is thus SMSY = ~= 2,856,740 tonnes. The corresponding maximum
sustainable yield and biomass are MSY = rt = 660,335 tonnes and XMSY =
(2+;)L = 3,517,075 tonnes.
Estimated growth functions for herring can be found in several pa-
pers. Bjørndal (1988) and Nøstbakken & Bjørndal (2003) estimate growth
functions for North Sea herring using data for the years 1947-1981 and
1981-2001, respectively. Amason et al. (2000) estimate a growth function
for Norwegian spring-spawning herring using data for the years 1950-
1995. However, in these papers it is assumed that growth is determined by
biomass Xt and not byescapement St as in the model estimated here. The
three papers mentioned above report intrinsic growth rates of 0.52, 0.47,
and 0.53, respectively. Our estimate of intrinsic growth rate, as reported
in Table 3.1, thus seems to be robust. In addition, all the estimated para-
meters presented in Table 3.1 are significant at the 5% significance level
and the estimated equation explains over 98% of the variation in the data.
Modelling the growth as a function of escapement as opposed to biomass
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at the beginning of the period seems to result in a higher adjusted R2 when
estimating recruitment to the herring fishery. Bjørndal's (1988) estimate
of carrying capacity for the North Sea herring is a spawning stock of 3.55
million tonnes, while Nøstbakken & Bjørndal (2003) reports a total stock
of 5.27 million tonnes. Incomparison, our estimate seems reasonable.
The model assumes the mean of 2t+1 is one. Unless otherwise stated,
we make the additional assumptions that the variance of 2t+1 is a~ = 0.05
and that 2t+1 is log-normally distributed." Ideally, we would estimate the
statistical properties of 2t+1 based on the residuals from the regression
of equation (3.16). With autocorrelated residuals, however, estimated z
values will not be independent and identically distributed (ild) as assumed
in the Reed (1979) model." If the stochastic variable is not iid, it is not
possible to derive an analytic solution to the optimisation problem. We
therefore treat the z values as ild. The fact that the z values are correlated
means, nonetheless, that knowing the value of z in one period enables one
to make better predictions about future z values. The assumption that the
stochastic variable is iid thus makes it more difficult for a social planner
to optimise expected net revenues from the fishery than it would be in the
case when the z values are correlated. The net benefits from the fishery
could therefore be higher under optimal management than what we find
6The lognormal distribution ensures that all z values are non-negative
7 Spulber (1982) extends the Reed (1979) model by assuming the random variable
follows a general Markov process, i.e., z = cp (·Iz), where cp ('Iz) is a given probability
function.
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in the subsequent analysis by assuming ild Zt+l'
Vessel Dynamics, Production Functions, Costs, and Prices
Bjørndal & Conrad (1987a) analyse capital dynamics in the North Sea her-
ring fishery. They estimate several fleet-adjustment equations but unfortu-
nately not equation (3.15). Data presented in Bjørndal and Conrad (1987b;
1987a) are therefore used to estimate the adjustment parameter n in equa-
tion (3.15). This gives us a point estimate of n = 10-1.8 Unless otherwise
stated, this estimate is used in the analysis.
Bjørndal & Conrad (1987b) estimate four production functions based
on data for Norwegian purse seine vessels in the North Sea herring fishery,
1963-1977. The two functions that best fit the data, along with Bjørndal
and Conrad's parameter estimates, are used in the current analysis." These
are the Spence production function (equation 3.5) with q = 0.0011, and
the Cobb-Douglas production function (equation 3.11) with a = 0.06157,
b = 1.356, and g = 0.562.
Following Nøstbakken & Bjørndal (2003), cost data for Norwegian
purse seine vessels with cargo capacity 8,000 hectolitres and above is used
in the analysis. Fixed costs are disregarded, since the vessels in ques-
80LS estimation: t-value=2.08, adjusted R2=O.l92, and DW(1,14) = 1.435.
9Bjørndal and Conrad's estimation was for a time period when the fishery was unreg-
ulated and econometric conditions for estimating a production function were satisfied.
This would not be the case for later periods due to varying regulations of the fishery. The
implication of using these parameters is that the efficiency of the fleet may be somewhat
underestimated due to technological development.
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tion participate in several seasonal fisheries in addition to the North Sea
herring fishery. This is appropriate, as the North Sea herring fishery is rel-
atively minor compared to other fisheries and does not require any special
equipment. The variable cost does not include costs to crew the vessels,
since crew remuneration represents a constant share of the vessel's rev-
enues. The income is, therefore, adjusted by a factor that represents the
boat owner's share. The price used in the analysis is average price paid to
the boat owners for North Sea herring, adjusted by a factor of 0.65, which
represents the boat owner's share of income. All prices and costs are in
nominal NOK. For 2001, the adjusted average price is 2,465 NOK/tonne,
and variable cost per vessel is 1,189,565 NOK/year. See Nøstbakken &
Bjørndal (2003) for details on cost and price estimation. A 6% discount rate
is used in the analysis.
3.3 Numerical Analysis
In this part, the North Sea herring fishery is analysed by using the two
production functions. Inboth cases, the open-access fishery and the opti-
mally regulated fishery are considered. Stochastic simulations are used in
the analysis. All simulations are programmed and run in Matlab.
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3.3.1 Model 1: The Spence Production Function
In the following section, the Spence harvesting relationship is used to
analyse the optimally regulated and the open-access fisheries.
The Optimally Regulated Fishery
By stochastic simulations, the optimal escapement level can be found for
given price, cost, and discount factor. Figure 3.1 shows the relationship
between optimal escapement level and price. The optimal escapement
level is not very sensitive to changes in the variance of 21+1' For low
prices, the figure shows that there is no difference between the curves that
represent optimal escapement levels for o; = 0.05 and o; = 0.20. As price
increases, the difference between the curves grows, but not very much. For
price p = 5 NOK/kg, the difference in optimal escapement level is about
136,000 tonnes. As p ~ 00, the optimal escapement level approaches 2.524
million tonnes (o; = 0.05). The optimal escapement level is thus very
insensitive to price changes for prices above p = 3 NOK/kg. For prices
below p = 0.2 NOK/kg, the escapement level is higher than the carrying
capacity of the environment L. Consequently, for prices below p = 0.2
NOK/kg, there is no harvesting.
By simulating the fishery under the optimal harvest policy over a long
time period, we can approximate the long-run statistical distributions of
X, Y, etc. Figure 3.2 shows the average long-term levels of biomass and
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Figure 3.1: Modell: Optimal Escapement Level. Variance ai = 0.05 (-)
and ai = 0.20 (c=l,189,565 NOK, {> = 0.06).
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harvest for different prices with confidence intervals.l? For harvest, only
the upper confidence limit can be seen - the lower level is below zero.
The confidence levels seem to be fairly constant for different prices. We
also find that the relative variation in annual harvest is much higher than
the variation in biomass. For prices above p = 2 NOK/kg, biomass is
some 3 million tonnes and the corresponding harvest is close to 700,000
tonnes. The shape of the harvest curve in Figure 2b is very similar to
Nøstbakken and Bjømdal's (2003) discounted equilibrium supply curve
for the North Sea herring fishery. However, the current stochastic analysis
implies positive harvest levels for prices significantly lower than the price
where harvest occurs in Nøstbakken and Bjørndal's deterministic analysis.
The Open-Access Fishery
Stochastic simulations of the open-access fishery are run for different prices
(N = 1,000 simulations over T = 200 years). The carrying capacity of the
environment L was used as the initial value for biomass, and the initial
number of vessels was set to K = 120. As price approaches infinity, so does
effort, and escapement S ~ 00. However, the simulation results show that
the stock can be severely depleted even at more realistic prices than p ~ 00.
lOA 66-percent confidence interval is shown in the figure, i.e., the mean plus or minus
one standard deviation. 66-percent confidence intervals are used in the remainder of the
paper.
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Figure 3.2: Modell: Optimal Stock and Harvest with Confidence Inter-
vals for Different Prices at Time t = 100.
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Figure 3.3: Modell: Open-Access Stock and Catch Dynamics with Con-
fidence Intervals (c = 1,189,565 NOK, P = 2 NOK/kg).
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Figure 3.3 gives stock and catch dynamics with confidence intervals
for price p = 2 NOK/kg. The long-term equilibrium stock level for this
price is about 710,000 tonnes with a corresponding annual catch of about
215,000 tonnes. There is overshooting and subsequently damped oscilla-
tion toward the equilibrium levels of biomass and harvest. The number
of vessels in the fishery also oscillates toward the long-term equilibrium
level, as can be seen in Figure 3.4a. If a different adjustment parameter
had been used, the degree of overshoot would have been different. Both
expected biomass and catch fall almost to zero where they settle for several
periods. In some of these periods, the biomass is under 20,000 tonnes, and
the annual harvest is as lowas about 5,000 tonnes. As mentioned earlier,
the stockcannot be driven to zero unless K ~ 00. This is why the stock after
a fairly long time period starts growing again and subsequently stabilises
at the open-access equilibrium level.
If a different adjustment parameter had been used, the degree of over-
shoot would have been different (see Figure 3.4b, where n = 5.10-1). The
dramatic initial increase in K can also be explained by the initial values of
biomass and number of vessels. The small number of vessels that harvests
from the relatively large stock of size L in the first period earns very high
net revenues. Since it was assumed that vessel dynamics follow the sign
and size of net revenues per vessel, the subsequent increase in the number
of vessels is very high.
Figure 3.5 shows the distributions of X and Y at time T = 200 for
3.3. Numerical Analysis 113
Figure 3.4: Modell: Open-Access Vessel Dynamics with Confi-
dence Interval, Adjustment Parameter (a)n = 10-1 and (b) n = 5 -10-1
(c = 1,189,565 NOK, P = 2 NOK/kg).
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Figure 3.5: Modell: Open-Access Stock and Harvest at Time t=200 with
Confidence Intervals (c = 1,189,565 NOK).
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different prices. For the stock, zero is within one standard deviation from
the mean if price is above 1.7 NOK/kg. Although X never reaches zero
(unless p ~ 00), it gets so close that the stock virtually has gone extinct
even for the prices shown in this figure. The harvest curve can be regarded
as a stochastic equivalent to the backward-bending open-access supply
curve described by Copes (1970) and estimated for the North Sea herring
fishery by Nøstbakken & Bjørndal (2003).
3.3.2 Model 2: The Cobb-Douglas Production Function
The optimally regulated and the open-access fisheries will now be analysed
when production economics are explained by the Cobb-Douglas function.
The Optimal Linear Feedback Policy
Optimal linear feedback policies (equation 3.14) are approximated by sto-
chastic simulations for different prices keeping other parameters constant.
These feedback rules are then applied to the dynamic model of the North
Sea herring fishery, which are simulated N = 1,000 times over T = 100
years. Initial biomass is set to L.
If price is too low, i.e., less than about 0.1 NOK/kg, harvesting is not
profitable at any stock level and both a and f3 in the linear feedback equation
(3.14) are zero. However, for prices above this level, the optimal linear
feedback seems to be rather insensitive to changes in price (and cost). The
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simulation results show that the optimal f3 stays very close to 1 although
it is decreasing in price. Optimal a increases with price, but the relative
change in a is small. For price p = 2, the optimal linear feedback policy
is approximately Y, = -2,850,000 + 0.99Xt• For positive values of Xt,
harvest never equals total stock and extinction of the stock is therefore
never optimal when p = 2. Recall from section 3.2.2 the "common sense"
condition for harvest O ~ Y, ~ Xt. We have already established that the
above feedback policyensures that Yt < Xt. From the condition Yt ;::: O we
thus get the following optimal (linear) feedback policy for the North Sea
herring fishery (p = 2):
{
O
Yt=
-2,850,000 + 0.99Xt
if x, < 2,880,000
(3.17)
otherwise
Figure 3.6 shows the simulation results for price p = 2 based on the
feedback policy given by equation (3.17). After a transition period, the
mean values of biomass and harvest level out at about 3.5 million tonnes
and 654,000 tonnes, respectively. These values are close to the maximum
sustainable yield levels of biomass and harvest (cf. section 3.2.3). If we,
however, look at individual realisations, we see that harvest changes from
zero in some periods to very high catches in other periods. The linear
feedback rule thus appears to lead to pulse fishing in this case. This is
illustrated in Figure 3.7, where one realisation of stock and catch dynamics
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Figure 3.6: Model 2: Optimal Management Stock and Catch Dynamics
with Confidence Intervals (c = 1,189,565 NOK, P = 2 NOK/kg, (j = 0.06).
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is shown.
Figure 3.7: Model 2: Optimal Management Stock and Harvest Realisa-
tions (c = 1,189,565 NOK, P = 2 NOK/kg, ()= 0.06).
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Stochastic simulations of the open-access fishery result in depletion of
the fish stock in all the N = l,OOO simulations (before time T = 100)
given that price is above a minimum level that makes fishing viable in the
first place. Initial biomass and number of vessels were set to L and 120,
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respectively. Bjørndal & Conrad (1987b) studied the dynamics of the North
Sea herring fishery using a deterministic model and the Cobb-Douglas
production function used here. They concluded that the likelihood of
overshooting and possible extinction under open access is greater with
discrete adjustments. Incorporating uncertainty into the stock-recruitment
relationship, as has been done here, further increases the likelihood of
overshooting compared to the deterministic case.
Figure 3.8: Model 2: Open Access Time of Extinction and Biomass at
Time t=lOOwith Confidence Intervals (c = 1,189,565 NOK).
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shown in Figure 3.8a for different prices. If price is above 1.1 NOK/kg, it
is very likely that the stock will go extinct within 30 years under an open-
access regime. The variance in time of extinction is very small for prices
above 1.2 NOK/kg. In these cases, the simulation results imply that the
stock will go extinct after five to ten years. Figure 3.8b shows biomass at
time T = 100 for different prices.
Time of extinction is influenced by the initial values of biomass and
number of vessels used in the numerical analysis. As in the open-access
case for Modell (Spence production function), there is a very large increase
in number of vessels from the first to the second time period because of
high net revenues in the first period resulting from the initial values of K
and X. The choice of initial values does however not affect the conclusion
that the stock eventually goes extinct under an open-access regime as long
as price is above 1.1 NOK/kg.
3.3.3 The North Sea Herring Fishery 1981-2001
In the following sections, Models 1 and 2 are used to simulate harvest
of North Sea herring, 1981-2001, under open access and optimal manage-
ment. Average prices and variable costs for these years obtained from the
Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries are used. The simulation results will be
compared to the actual harvest policies for the North Sea herring fishery.
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Open-Access Dynamics
We start out by simulating the open-access dynamics of the North Sea
herring fishery, 1981-2001. Initial biomass in 1981 was, according to ICES,
1,160,300 tonnes. Initial number of vessels is set to 120.
The simulation results from the N = 1,000 simulations show that in
Model 2 (Cobb-Douglas production function) the stock would go extinct
after about 10 years (1990). The corresponding prediction when using
Modell is, as expected, that the stock would not have gone extinct. Recall
that when using the Spence production function, price has to approach
infinity for the stock to go extinct. As a result, the number of vessels and
harvest decrease steadily until the stock eventually starts increasing again.
Full depletion is within one standard deviation from the average stock
level from 1996 onwards. In Mode12, the same is true from 1988 onwards.
Figure 3.9 shows open-access dynamics in terms of number of vessels
and stock levels for the two models. By comparing vessel dynamics, we
see that the number of vessels reaches its maximum in 1990 in Modell and
in 1989 in Model 2. Until1984-1985 the models appear to be somewhat
similar. From this point onwards, however, the two models' predictions
are quite different. In both models the number of vessels is increasing
while stock levels are decreasing. The approximate change in number of
vessels is from 400 to 550 in Modell and from 440 to 600 in Model 2. The
corresponding change in biomass is from 1,650 thousand tonnes to 640 and
160, respectively. While this change only takes four years in Mode12, the
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Figure 3.9: Open-Access Dynamics, 1981-2002: Modell (.) (Spence) and
Model 2 (Cobb-Douglas).
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same process takes about six years in Modell.
2,000
To answer the question whether open access could lead to stock extinc-
tion, one would get very different conclusions depending on which model
specification one uses. Both the Spence and the Cobb-Douglas functions
fit the data (Bjørndal & Conrad, 1987b). It is difficult to say which of the
two models offers the best description of the harvest relationship in the
North Sea herring fishery. The fishery has not been unregulated since the
1970s.11 We therefore have no real observations to compare the simulation
results to.
l1See Nøstbakken & Bjørndal (2003) on regulations of the North Sea herring fishery
1981-2001.
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The choice of model (Cobb-Douglas or Spence production functions)
does not have a big impact on predictions if the stock level is not very
low. In periods when the stock is close to zero, however, the two models
give very different predictions. The models' predictions for periods when
the stock is close to total extinction should therefore be evaluated when
determining what production function to use when modelling the North
Sea herring fishery. When the North Sea herring fishery was closed in 1977,
the stock level was close to extinction. It is possible that the moratorium
saved the stock from going extinct as put forward by Bjørndal & Conrad
(1987b). This would suggest that the Cobb-Douglas function best describes
the fishery. However, since the stock never has gone extinct, it could
very well be possible that the Spence production function gives a better
description of harvest in the fishery. In that case, we have seen that open
access would not have resulted in total depletion of the North Sea herring
stock.
Optimal Management
We now compare the performance of the optimal harvest policies, in terms
of annual harvest and revenues, to the actual harvest of North Sea herring
over the period 1981-2001. To make the comparison fair, the size of the
environmental shock in each period (ZI) is calculated based on the estimated
stock-recruitment function and actual stock levels: ZI = ~ = G(~:-l).
In the previous sections, we found that the choice ofharvest relationship
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used in the bioeconomic model (Spence or Cobb-Douglas) was critical for
the predicted open-access dynamics. This, however, does not seem to
be important when determining optimal harvest for the period 1981-2001.
Both annual harvest and stock levels are almost identical in the two models,
as can be seen in Figure 3.10. The actual harvest and stock, on the other
hand, deviate from the optimal policies.
According to both our models, optimal management implies that the
moratorium should not have been lifted in 1981- the fishery should on the
contrary have stayed closed until1983. This would have rebuilt the stock
to a level of some three million tonnes where the stock subsequently levels
out. Remember that the total biomass that corresponds to MSY according
to our estimates is about 3.52 million tonnes. Expected optimal harvest
would therefore have been close to MSY.
Harvest under the optimal management policies fluctuates significantly
with annual harvests between a high of 1,160 thousand tonnes in 1987
and a low of 105 thousand tonnes in 1994. These fluctuations follow the
fluctuations in z. The optimal escapement level changes some from year
to year as prices and costs change. The environmental shocks, however,
are what cause most of the fluctuations in optimal harvest (Yl and Y2) in
Figure 3.10.
In spite of the fact that totallandings were above optimal harvesting
levels in the early 1980s, total biomass grew steadily until it reached 3.94
million tonnes in 1987. This is very close to the optimal stock size in
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Figure 3.10: Optimal Policies, 1981-2002: Models 1 (Spence) and 2 (Cobb-
Douglas) versus Actual Policy; Stock Levels (top) and Annual Catches
(bottom), (j = 0.06.
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1987. One explanation for this rather large increase in actual biomass is the
substantial positive environmental shocks in the early 1980s. From 1987
until1996, however, the North Sea herring stock showed a declining trend.
During this period the actual harvest policy was undoubtedly suboptimal.
From 1997 onwards, quotas have been small to allow the stock to grow. The
stock in 2003 was about 4.32 million tonnes according to ICES (2003). The
stock has thus been allowed to grow to a level far above what maximises
net revenues from the fishery.
Figure 3.11: Sum of Present Value of Revenues from 1981 Onward.
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Figure 3.11 shows sum of present value of net revenues from 1981
onwards for the two optimal harvest policies and actual harvest." The
two optimal harvest policies derived from the bioeconomic model give al-
12The sum of present value of net revenues for year t is defined as: PVI =
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most the same net revenues, although the optimal escapement policy from
Modell (Spence) results in marginally higher discounted net revenues.
The gap between the accumulated discounted revenue lines for the two
optimal policies is not constant. It increases in some years and decreases
in other years, meaning that the constant escapement policy performs best
in some periods, while the linear feedback policy is better in other periods.
The actual policy has the highest present value of revenues for the
periods 1981 through 1984 and 1981 through 1996. However, while the
stock level under optimal management would have been 3.3-3.4 million
tonnes in 1996, the stock level under the actual regulations was only 1.6
million tonnes. It is therefore not correct to say that the actual management
(1981-1996) was better than the optimal harvest policies. Furthermore, for
the whole period, 1981-2001, the two optimal policies clearly outperform
the actual harvest policy. As can be seen in Figure 3.10, the actual stock level
(X) equals the optimal stock levels (Xl and X2) in 2002. When comparing
present value of revenues from 1981 to 2001, the three policies - Model
1, Model 2, and actual - have the same initial stock in the first year and
virtually the same escapement in the last year. Comparing policies over
this period should therefore be reasonable.
The optimal policy from Model2 (Cobb-Douglas) is, as discussed ear-
lier, the optimal feedback policy among linear policies. The linear feedback
tr. (1 + 6i-s R, , where R, is net revenues in year s, and 6 is the discount rate.
s=1981
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policy can be the best of all possible policies. There might, however, be
non-linear feedback policies which outperform the optimal linear policy.
Nevertheless, the fact that the linear feedback policy gives almost the same
results as the optimal escapement policy (Modell) indicates that a linear
feedback probably is a close approximation of the optimal policy.
Inthis section we have seen thatthe difference in optimal annualharvest
levels is very small when modelling the North Sea herring fishery with
a Spence production function compared to a Cobb-Douglas production
function. This result is contrary to what we found when analysing open-
access dynamics. The fact that the two harvest relationships give so similar
recommendations for optimal harvest of North Sea herring strengthens the
robustness of these policies.
3.4 Summary and Conclusions
In this paper, a stochastic model has been used to analyse the management
of North Sea herring. Looking at stock-recruitment data for the North
Sea herring fishery, it is obvious that there are fluctuations that cannot
be explained in the standard deterministic bioeconomic models. These
fluctuations have been treated as environmental shocks occurring after
harvesting in one period, but before determining harvest quotas in the
next period.
Two different production functions have been used in the analysis. The
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long-term supply in an open-access fishery was seen to be positive when
using the Spence production function, given that price is high enough
for fishing to be viable. We found that the corresponding result when
using the Cobb-Douglas production function was total extinction of the
fish stock and consequently no harvesting in the long run. Herring prices
are and have been more than high enough for the stock to go extinct if the
fishery is left unregulated (Cobb-Douglas). Although the results in terms
of expected long-term harvest are very different between the two models,
predicted harvest in periods when biomass is not close to extinction was
found to be quite similar when comparing the models.
In an optimally regulated fishery, the Spence production function gives
us a constant-escapement rule, as proved by Reed (1979). The optimal
escapement level was seen to decrease with price. For the model based
on the Cobb-Douglas production function, the analysis was limited to
finding optimal linear feedback policies for the fishery. The optimal linear
policy was fairly insensitive to changes in price. We found that the linear
feedback can lead to pulse fishing. The optimal policies for the two harvest
functions were seen to be very similar when applying them to the North
Sea herring fishery, 1981-2001. This indicates that the optimal feedback
policy when using a Cobb-Douglas function is not very different from our
linear feedback rule. This result also confirms that as long as the stock is
close to MSY, or not too close to extinction, the sensitivity of the results to
the choice of production function in the model is modest.
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The North Sea herring fishery was closed in 1977 to allow the stock to
recover after being severely depleted in the 1960s and 1970s. The morato-
rium was lifted in 1981 in the southern part of the North Sea and in 1983
in the northern part. We have tried to evaluate the actual management
of the North Sea herring fishery from 1981 through 2001. According to
our analysis, optimal management of the North Sea herring would have
implied that the fishery stayed closed until1983. While quotas were found
to be too high in the first part of the 1981-2001 period, the problem in the
last part of the period seems, on the contrary, to be that quotas have been
set too low.
Our analysis confirms the conclusion made in Nøstbakken & Bjørndal
(2003) that the regulatory regime can have a substantial impact on the
supply of North Sea herring. The difference in expected long-run supply
between open access and optimal management depends on the harvest
function used, but is nevertheless considerable. Optimal management
results in expected annual landings close to the maximum sustainable
yield of 660 thousand tonnes. Under open access, the long-run equilibrium
stock and harvest can be zero (Cobb-Douglas) or close to zero (Spence).
These results are similar to Nøstbakken and Bjørndal's (2003) results for
the deterministic case.
This paper represents a continuation of the work in Nøstbakken &
Bjørndal (2003). The current analysis can be extended in several ways.
One possibility would be to introduce measurement error in the stock esti-
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mates (cf. Clark & Kirkwood, 1986). This would also allow for an analysis
of optimal management instruments (cf. Weitzman, 2002), and an analy-
sis of how different management instruments affect the supply of herring.
Another possibility would be to explore implications for optimal man-
agement of having autocorrelated instead of independent and identically
distributed environmental shocks. The analysis could be extended further
by combining the supply curves with estimations of demand curves in
order to study the market for North Sea herring.
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Abstract
We develop a bioeconomic model of a fishery subject to stock uncertainty
and price uncertainty. With a linear control model, the optimal harvest
policy is a bang-bang approach to the optimal stock level, where one
harvests either at minimum or full capacity. It is assumed that changing
the harvest rate is subject to a switching cost. In this case we show that
there are two switching curves in stock-price space, one for entering and
one for leaving the fishery. Numerical methods are used to characterize
the optimal switching policy for the fishery.
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4.1 Introduction
Over the last couple of decades there has been an increase in the application
of stochastic bioeconomic models in the literature with prices, biological
parameters, etc. fluctuating according to stochastic processes. Whereas
the literature contains numerous studies of the management of natural
resources under some kind of uncertainty, most of them only analyse how
one source of uncertainty influences the bioeconomic model. Few studies
consider the effects on optimal management of several sources of uncer-
tainty that simultaneously affect different parts of the bioeconomic model.
The purpose of this study is to analyse how uncertainty in stock growth
and price influence the optimal harvest of fish. We build our modelon
the well-known deterministic linear-control model presented by Clark &
Munro (1975). When the stock reaches the criticallevel, harvest is set
at some interior value, which maintains the optimal stock level (steady
state). Uncertainty is incorporated into the model by letting price and
stock-recruitment evolve according to known stochastic processes. The
Clark-Munro model is further extended by introducing switching costs. It
seems reasonable to assume that increasing and/or decreasing the harvest
rate incurs certain costs. We therefore assume lump-sum switching costs
of changing the harvest rate. Itwill be shown that the optimal harvest is
either to harvest at minimum or full capacity. While it is not possible to find
a closed form solution to the optimisation problem, numerical methods can
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be used to approximate the solution. These will be used to characterise the
optimal policy, which is defined by regime-switching curves instock-price
space; one for activating the fishing fleet and one for withdrawing the fleet
from the fishery.
Of related work, Clarke & Reed (1989) and Reed & Clarke (1990) in-
troduced price and growth uncertainty in a forest harvest model, mod-
elling the price process as geometric Brownian motion and assuming stock
growth to be age or size dependent. Brennan & Schwartz (1985) present
a model where a project, a mine is used as an example, can operate in
two modes; active or passive. There is one output, and the output price
fluctuates according to a known stochastic process. The payoff from the
project depends on the current output price and on the choice of output
rate. Switching between the active and the passive modes is done at a fixed
cost. Brennan and Schwartz are able to derive expressions for the value
of the project. They also consider optimal management of the mine. In
his study of entry and exit decisions under uncertainty, Dixit (1989) builds
on the analysis in Brennan & Schwartz (1985). Dixit makes several sim-
plifications to the Brennan and Schwartz model, such as assuming a fixed
production rate in the active state. This allows him to derive analytical
results. In a recent work, Lumley & Zervos (2001) analyse optimal invest-
ment in a non-renewable natural resource industry subject to switching
costs.
The theory on real options has been developed over the past two
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decades. Real option theory involves treating investment projects as op-
tions to invest, and the investment projects can be anything from job search
or whether to open a factory, to the exploitation of natural resources. Finan-
cial economics offer techniques to price options and to determine optimal
exercise time or state. The real options approach is therefore a conve-
nient way to analyse investment projects and is especially valuable when
analysing projects involving uncertainty. The literature on real options
contains many examples of optimal switching models. Dixit & Pindyck
(1994) give a good introduction to real options and they present several
models of optimal switching. Other examples of optimal switching models
can be found in Trigeorgis (1996), and in the recent collection of Schwartz
& Trigeorgis (2001).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section
specifies the bioeconomic model. The numerical analysis, where we char-
acterise the optimal policy, is presented in section 4.3. A summary and
conclusions are presented in section 4.4.
4.2 Model Specification
Let the fish stock at instant t be denoted by X = X(t), where time is
continuous, with 00 > t ~ O. Instantaneous harvest from the stock, the
harvest rate, is denoted by Y = Y(t). There is an upper limit to how
much the fishing fleet can harvest at every instant of time given by the
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maximum harvest rate Ymax' We therefore have Ymax;::: y ;:::O.We assume
the dynamics of the resource stock X is given by:
dX = [F (X) - Y] dt + (JxXdzx, (4.1)
where F(X) is a strictly concave growth function, with F(O) = F(K) = Oand
where K > Ois the carrying capacity of the environment. The term (JxXdzx
represents the stochastic part of the stock-growth relationship and can be
thought of as random environmental fluctuations. (JxX is the standard
deviation rate, ax > O,dzx = €(t) Ydt, where €(t) is a standard normal, lid,
random variable. It follows that z(t) is a Wiener process. Clark & Munro
(1975) explain growth by an equation similar to the deterministic part of
equation (4.1).
The price of the resource, P, is assumed to follow a process of geometric
Brownian motion (GBM), given by:
dP = fJPdt + (JpPdzp, (4.2)
where fJ ;:::Ois the drift rate and (JpP is the standard deviation rate, (Jp > O.
dz» = €(t) Ydt is also an increment of a Wiener process. We further assume
that E {dzx,dzp} = O,i.e., we are dealing with a small fishery whose harvest
has no affect on the world price, P. A positive drift rate implies that prices
are increasing over time, perhaps reflecting a growing demand for fish
protein or a decline in stocks, world-wide.
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We make the standard assumption that an agent seeks to maximise the
expected present value of net revenues from the fishery over an infinite
horizon subject to the dynamic constraints given by equations (4.1) and
(4.2).1 Assume the cost per unit fish harvested is c(X), with c'(X) < Oand
c"(X) > O. If there is no uncertainty, i.e., ifax = ap = O,and if the price is
constant (fl- = O),the model is exactly the same as the Clark-Munro model
(1975). The optimal control problem is
00
'(X, P) = max Etf (P - c(X))Ye-ptdtl,
{Yl
(4.3)
where p is the discount rate, subject to (4.1) and (4.2). The optimal harvest
will therefore, at every instant of time, follow the most rapid approach
path (MRAP) toward the optimal stock level. The optimal harvest is con-
sequentlyeither Y = Oor Y = Ymax' In the deterministic case (ax = ap = O)
with constant price, the optimal harvest rate is a bang-bang approach to
the optimal stock level, then a constant harvest rate to maintain the optimal
steady state.
We will assume that a switching cost is incurred for any change in
harvest rate. The cost of increasing the harvest rate is A12 and the cost of
decreasing the harvest rate is A21• This changes the original problem and
one might question if the MRAP solution is still optimal. Let ti and T j,
1Fixed costs are disregarded as we assume the fleet in question partidpates in other,
and to the fleet, more important fisheries.
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where i = I, ..., nand j = I, ...,m, be the times of increases and decreases
in harvest rate, respectively. The net present value of the cost of the n + m
changes in harvest rate must now be subtracted from the expression given
by equation (4.3). The control problem is nevertheless still linear in harvest
and is therefore maximised by the MRAP solution. Any approach other
than bang-bang lowers the expected discounted value of net revenues. This
implies that as long as it is optimal to vary the harvest rate at all, it is optimal
to switch between zero and Ymax since the cost of doing so is the same as
the cost of switching between interior harvest rates (Ymax > Y > O).Hence,
the MRAP solution maximises the expected value of the fishery subject to
switching costs if the MRAP solution is also better than harvesting at a
constant harvest rate at all times. This is what we investigate next.
Let the fishery be partiallyopen at all times with a fixed harvest rate of
mY max (1 > m > O). By choosing this strategy switching costs are avoided.
The corresponding stochastic control problem can be expressed as
(4.4)
where dX = [F(X) - mYmax]dt + oxXdzx, while dP as before is given by
equation (4.2). The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the problem
4.2. Model Specification 143
stated in equation (4.4) is
pV = s~p {(p - c(X»mY max + (F(X) - mYmax)VX + ,uPVp
1 2X2V 1 2p2V }+ 2:0x xx + 2:0p pp.
The maximum condition for the problem is
at·}am = (P - C(X) - VX)Y max = O,
and we see that the supremum cannot be reached for any value of m. This
implies that the optimal solution to the profit maximisation problem is a
bang-bang solution. The optimal harvest rate is consequently either Y = O
or Y = Ymax and we can define two regimes; R = I, inactive, and R = 2,
active (harvesting at the rate Y = Ymax).2
Brekke & Øksendal (1994) characterise the solution of a switching
model, which encompasses the current one. Using stochastic calculus,
they derive conditions for the optimal solution to the problem and prove
the existence of a solution. The optimal value function V(X, P,R) for the
2Since it could become optimal to harvest the stock to extinction the harvest rate is
also limited by the available stock, i.e., Y = {O,min(Y max, X)}.
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fisheries management problem must satisfy,"
pV(X,P, R) ~ rr(X,P,R)+[F(X)-Y]Vx(X,P,R)
+ flPVp (X, P, R) + O.5a~X2Vxx (X,P,R) (4.5)
+ O.5a~p2Vpp(X,P,R)
and the condition
V(X, P, R) ~ V(X, P, i) - ARi, R "* i, (4.6)
where R E (1,2) is regime, and rr(X,P,R) = [P - c(X)]Y max(R-1) is the flow
of net revenues per unit of time from harvesting the stock in regimes 1 and
2. The left-hand side of equation (4.5) is the fishery's opportunity cost in
regime R, while the right-hand side, which gives the sum of instantaneous
net revenues and value gain from changes in price and stock, is the return
rate in regime R. The condition given by equation (4.6) states that the
value of remaining in regime R must be at least as high as the value of
regime switching, given by the value of being in the other regime minus
the cost of switching. In addition to the conditions given by equations (4.5)
and (4.6), the optimal value function must satisfy some regularity condi-
tions, namely the value matching and smooth pasting conditions. These
3 Dixit & Pindyck (1994) provide necessary and sufficient conditions to similar real
options problems.
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regularity conditions are given by equations (4.7) and (4.8), respectively.
V(Xentry, Pentry, 1) = V(Xentry, Pentry,2) + A21
V(Xexit, Pexit, 2) = V(Xexit, Pexit, 1) + A12 (4.7)
VX(Xi, Pi, 1) = VX(Xi,Pi,2), for i = {entry,exit}
Vp(Xi,Pi,2) = Vp(Xi, Pi, 1), for i = {entry,exit} (4.8)
The optimal policy can be defined by switching curves in stock-price
space. If A12 > ° and/or A21 > 0, there are two switching curves in X - P
space; one for entering the fishery (moving from regime 1 to regime 2)
and one for leaving the fishery (moving from regime 2 to regime 1). The
switching curves are implied by equations (4.5) and (4.6). In regime 1, one is
indifferent between entering the fishery and staying inactive if V(X, P, 1) =
V(X, P,2) - A12• This defines the entry curve. Similarly, in regime 2 one
is indifferent between leaving and staying active if V(X, P,2) = V(X, P, 1) -
A21, which defines the exit curve. Between the two switching curves
both harvesting and inactivity can be optimal depending on what one is
currently doing; the optimal behaviour is to remain passive. The higher
the switching costs, the larger the area between the switching curves and
the less frequent would be switches by the fleet. If V(X, P, 1) > V(X,P,2),
inactivity is always optimal, whereas if V(X, P, 1) < V(X, P,2) it is always
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optimal to harvest. Dixit (1989) describes how the presence of uncertainty
and switching costs can result in hysteresis, which he defines as "the failure
of an effect to reverse itself as its underlying cause is reversed". This inertia
explains why there are two switching curves in X - P space and not one as
would be the case in a fishery without switching costs. In the next section
numerical methods are used to approximate optimal switching curves for
the fishery.
4.3 Numerical Analysis
The optimality conditions, along with regularity conditions can be used
to numerically approximate the optimal switching curves for the problem.
In this section we first study the long-run distribution of biomass when
there is no harvesting. Next, optimal switching curves for the fishery
are approximated and the optimal management fishery is simulated and
characterised."
Before we can initiate the numerical analysis we need to make assump-
tions about the specific forms of the cost and growth functions and we
must specify model parameters. First, we assume a cost per unit of har-
vest of c(X) == f, a unit cost function which corresponds to the Schaefer
production function and a constant cost of c per unit effort. Second, stock
4The numerical analysis utilises the CompEcon Toolbox (for Matlab) as developed
by Miranda & Fackler (2002). The Matlab code used in this section can be made available
by the author upon request.
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growth is assumed to follow the logistic growth function F(X) = rX(l- ~),
where r is the intrinsic growth rate. Parameter values are summarised in
Table 4.1. Note that the maximum harvest rate is set to Ymax = 0.25. This
is above the maximum sustainable yield of MSY = r: = 0.125 and it is
thus impossible to harvest at full capacity at all times without driving the
stock to extinction. We assume no drift in the price of fish, i.e., fl = O.
For most commercial fish stocks this seems to be a reasonable assumption.
The assumption does however not affect our results in any significant way.
The same is the case for the assumption of A12 = A21; the equality is not
necessary and does not qualitatively change the results.
Table 4.1: Parameter Values
Parameter Value Description
r 0.5 Intrinsic growth rate
K 1 Biological carrying capacity
c 0.25 Cost per unit effort
Ymax 0.25 Upper bound harvest rate
fl O Price drift
(Jp 0.2 Price diffusion
(Jx 0.3 Stock diffusion
6 0.1 Discount rate
A12 0.01 Cost of increasing harvest rate
A21 0.01 Cost of decreasing harvest rate
The long-run distribution of the pristine stock is found numerically
using equation (4.1) with Y = O,the logistic growth function, and parameter
values as presented in Table 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Long-Run Stock Density, Y = O. Base case ax = 0.30 (solid
line), ax = 0.45 (dash-dot line), and ax = 0.15 (dashed line).
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Figure 4.1 shows the long-run density functions for the base case (ax =
0.3) and for standard deviation rates 0.15 and 0.45. Dixit & Pindyck (1994)
2
note that EX = K(1 - ~~). The stock density varies significantly with the
value of the standard deviation rate ax. For ax = 0.3, the base case, the
vast majority of stock realisations are within the interval0.15 to 2, where 2
is twice the size of the carrying capacity. The stock can in theory go extinct
even in the no-fishing case but the likelihood of this is approximately zero.
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4.3.1 Optimal Switching Curves
Optimal switching curves for the fishery are found using a cubic spline ap-
proximation function. A spline can be described as any smooth function
that is piecewise polynomial but also smooth where the polynomial pieces
connect (see e.g. Judd, 1998). A cubic spline is constructed of piecewise
third-order polynomials and produces continuous first and second deriv-
atives. A Matlab procedure described in Fackler (2004) is used to obtain
the numerical solution. The procedure uses function approximation and
collocation to find the optimal solution characterised by the optimality
conditions (4.5) and (4.6). In addition to these, we know that the fish-
ery is valueless if the stock goes extinct and therefore add the condition
V(O,P,R) = O, which must hold for all P and R.
The approximate optimal switching curves can be seen in Figure 4.2.
The two curves labelled entry and exit are the optimal switching curves
in the base case (positive switching costs). The third curve in Figure 4.2
represents the case of no switching costs. The continuous state space
must be discretised into a finite set of state nodes when approximating the
optimal policy and this explains why the curves are not smooth. For X,
100 evenly spaced points on the interval [0,2] are used to make the grid
of state nodes. Considering the long-run stock distribution (Figure 4.1),
we see that the interva12 ~ X ~ 0.15 covers virtually every possible stock
realisation. The long-run distribution of price, on the other hand, depends
on initial price. For P, 100 evenly spaced points on the interval [0,2.5] are
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Figure 4.2: Approximate Switching Curves. Base Case (thin lines) and
with No Switching Costs (thick line).
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chosen when defining the grid of state nodes.
Obviously, as price increases, it gets more and more profitable to harvest
the stock, everything else being equal (Figure 4.2). The same is true as
stock increases since the unit cost of harvesting is decreasing in stock size.
Accordingly, it is always optimal to harvest when price is high and stock
is high, while inactivity, or no harvest, is optimal if both variables are at
low levels. In other cases the switching curves reflect the fact that there
are trade offs between getting a high (low) price and having a low (high)
stock. The sensitivity of the switching curves to changes in either of the
two state variables decreases with the value of the state variable.
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The switching curve representing entry into the fishery lies above the
exit curve. It follows that there is an area between the two curves where
fishing can be optimal or suboptimal, depending on the current regime.
This is the band ofhysteresis, as described earlier. The distance between the
switching curves depends on the switching costs. If there are no switching
costs there is only one curve, as can be seen in Figure 4.2. As the switching
costs increase, the distance between the curves grows. Eventually, at very
high switching costs, there will be no switching curves since no possible
realisations of price and stock exist where harvest revenues would make
up for the switching costs.
To our best knowledge, this is the first study of optimal switching
curves in a fishery with stochastic stock and price.
4.3.2 The Optimal Management Fishery
The long-run consequences of following the optimal switching policy are
found by stochastic simulations. The policy given by the base-case switch-
ing curves described above are simulated 2,000 times over T = 5,000 time
increments, where each time increment is set to dt = 0.001. Initial values
of price and stock are 1 and D.s, respectively. Sample realisations of price
and stock are shown in Figure 4.3. The stock level is higher when the price
is low than when price is high. This, of course, is because the stock is
being harvested down whenever it is high enough to justify activating the
fleet. The higher the price, the sooner activation becomes optimal. The
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long-run density of stock is shown in Figure 4.4 along with the density of
the pristine stock.
Figure 4.3: Sample Realisations of Price and Stock.
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According to the simulation results, a moratorium is in effect in the
fishery most of the time. The average harvest at time increment T shows
that a positive harvest rate (Y) is optimal only 45% of the time. The rest of
the time the fishery is closed. A different choice of parameter values alters
this. Nevertheless, the conclusion that the fishery stays closed a large share
of the time does not come as a total surprise. Remember that we set the
maximum harvest rate to Ymax' This is twice the maximum sustainable
yield rate of 0.125. As a consequence it takes little time to harvest the
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Figure 4.4: Long-Run Stock Density: Optimal Policy and No Harvesting
(dashed line).
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stock down from above the entry curve to below the exit curve. It can
take considerably more time for the stock to grow back up to a level above
the entry curve and as a result, the fishery is closed a large part of the
time. What we find is referred to as pulse fishing in the literature (see e.g.
Hannesson, 1975). Pulse fishing has been shown to be optimal in several
cases where the control model is linear, i.e., when the cost of increasing
capacity in the fishery is linear. If, on the other hand, we were dealing
with a non-linear control problem, pulse-fishing would have been more
surprising.
We set out to approximate optimal switching curves for the fishery and
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to study the implications of applying the optimal policy as defined by the
switching curves. With this in place, we can analyse the sensitivity of the
solutions to parameter changes. This is what we turn to next.
4.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis
We start out by evaluating the case analysed in Clark & Munro (1975).
Steady-state conditions are easily derived for the deterministic case with-
out fleet-adjustment costs. This case will therefore be used as a benchmark.
We also analyse how changes in stock and price volatilities (ai, i = X,P)
affect the switching curves, how sensitive the curves are to changes in
growth rate, and finally, how changes in the maximum harvest rate affect
the results presented in the previous section.
In the deterministic case with fixed price and no switching costs, there
is an optimal steady-state stock level X* realised at a certain harvest rate
Y*E [O,Ymax]. In steady state, harvest is set at some interior value which
maintains the optimal stock level. Steady state stock and harvest rate are
given by
P - c(X*) =
F(X*)c'(X*)
P(X*) - P
Y* = F(X*).
Based on the first equation we can calculate steady-state combinations
of stock and price, which can be represented as a curve in stock-price space.
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This curve is similar to the switching curves shown in Figure 4.2 for the
stochastic case. If the fishery is not currently in steady state one should,
depending on the current state, harvest either at Ymax or not at all until
steady state is reached. In the deterministic case there will only be one
switching curve even if fleet adjustments are subject to switching costs.
When one knows everything there is no need to make fleet adjustments
after the optimal steady state is reached. One will switch at most once and
as a result the switching costs do not change anything.
From the steady-state relationship we know it is not optimal to harvest
at any positive, finite price for stock levels X ~ (r- 6)f,. This means that the
stock must be above 004 in our fishery for there to exist a positive steady-
state harvest rate. Further, if price is less than P = R (= 0.25) fishing is not
viable at any stock level X E [O, K]. In comparison, we have established
that harvesting in a stochastic setting can be optimal at stock levels well
below 004 and finite prices (see Figure 4.2). Similarly, as stock increases it
can be optimal for the fleet to stay active even though price is less than
0.25 and stock is 1. The reason is inertia; because of the uncertainty, it is
better to keep the fleet active for a while in case things take a better turn,
than paying the switching cost. The sensitivity of the switching curves
with respect to price and stock volatility is presented in Figure 4.5. The
degree of volatility does not affect the switching curves much. Note also
how the deterministic steady-state curve matches the exit curve at high
stock levels, and the entry curve at high price levels.
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Figure 4.5: Approximate Switching Curves. Base Case (thick lines),
Deterministic (thick dash-dot line), High Volatility with øx = 0.45 and
(jp = 0.30 (thin dashed lines), and Low Volatility with (jx = 0.15 and
(jp = 0.10 (thin lines).
2.5,--,.-_,.--,rrr-""I·.Tl.-,.-----r----r-----,--,---,.---r---,
I:
I
I:
I,
I'.
I :
i :
I:
2
1.5
0.5
°0~~0~.2--0~.4-~0.~6-~OL.8-~1-~1.2~~1.L4--1L.6-~1.8-~2
Stock (X)
The growth rate of the stock limits the fishing fleet's harvest. The higher
the intrinsic growth rate, the higher the maximum sustainable yield. Figure
4.6 shows approximate switching curves for alternative growth rates. The
exit curve is fairly insensitive to changes in growth rate. The entry curve,
on the other hand, changes with the growth rate - the higher the growth
rate, the closer the entry curve is to the exit curve. This means that the
fleet is active a larger share of the time when the growth rate is high, other
things being equal. This is reasonable since a higher growth rate means a
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Figure 4.6: Approximate Switching Curves. Base case r = 0.5 (thin lines),
r = 0.25 (thick line), and r = 0.75 (thick dash-dot lines).
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larger stock growth and more fish available in the sea for harvesting. At
high stock levels, the growth rate affects the switching curves very little.
So far we have assumed that we are dealing with a fishing fleet capable
of harvesting at a rate twice as high as the maximum sustainable yield rate.
Inmany fisheries, however, the capacity of the fishing fleet is not nearly as
high as this and it is therefore interesting to see what happens to the fishery
as we reduce the maximum harvest rate of the fleet. New switching curves
are approximated for the fishery with maximum harvest rates 0.15 and
0.05, the latter being well below the maximum sustainable harvest rate.
Other parameters are as presented in Table 4.1. As can be seen in Figure
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Figure 4.7: Approximate Switching Curves. Base case (thin lines),
Ymax = 0.15 (thick line), and Ymax = 0.05 (thick dash-dot lines).
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4.7, a reduction in Ymax has little effect on the switching curves for high
stock levels (X > 0.9). For lower levels of the stock, however, the change
is significant and the smaller the maximum harvest rate, the closer the
switching curves are to the price axis. The difference in sensitivity between
high and low stock levels can be explained by the fact that the value of
having a large stock is limited when the maximum harvest rate is small.
This is similar to what Hannesson (1993) finds in his example of the capelin
fishery. In addition, we see that the distance between the entry and exit
curves seems to increase with Ymax' In a deterministic setting a maximum
harvest rate of 0.05 would result in a constant harvest at full capacity for
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price P ~ 0.60. Simulations of the stochastic fishery (with Xo = 0.5 and
Po = 1) show that something similar happens there; the fleet will be active
approximately 98% of the time when Ymax = 0.05. This corresponds to
an average stock of 0.71. Table 4.2 summarises the sensitivity statistics.
Table 4.2: Fishery Characteristics by Maximum Harvest Rate, Ymax
Ymax = 0.05 Ymax = 0.15 Ymax = 0.25
Fishery open, share of time
Biomass, mean
Biomass, standard deviation
98%
0.71
0.28
69%
0.49
0.19
45%
0,45
0.12
The variation in stock level is seen to decrease with the maximum rate of
harvest. The difference in long-run average biomass between the cases
ymax = 0.15 and Ymax = 0.25 is relatively small, which makes the fairly
large difference in variation noteworthy. A larger maximum harvest rate
enables the fleet to faster bring the stock back to its desired level when
something changes. We are however dealing with a fleet that harvests
either at Ymax or not at all, and a large Ymax could therefore cause increased
volatility in biomass.
4.4 Summary and Conclusions
In this study we have seen how entry and exit curves can be computed
when both the stock and the price of a natural resource evolve stochastically
and when there are costs to changing the harvest rate. The production
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function, which was used to explain harvesting in the model, is linear in
effort. Under the assumption of a constant cost per unit effort, we end up
with a linear control problem. When maximising the total present value of
net revenues over an infinite horizon, the optimal policy is consequently
to harvest at full or at minimum capacity. The optimal policy has been
defined by switching curves in stock-price space. Bymaking the additional
assumption that changing the harvest rate is subject to switching costs, we
show that there exist two curves in stock-price space, one for activating
the fleet and one for withdrawing the fleet from the fishery. These curves
are numerically approximated and we study the fishery when employing
the optimal switching policy. In a deterministic setting, the switch from
harvesting at full or minimum capacity to maintaining an optimal stock
level (steady state) occurs at most once with price constant. With stock and
price uncertainty there is no stead y sta te and it is optimal to switch back and
forth between minimum and maximum harvest rates. The dual switching
curves are a result of the combination of uncertainty and switching costs
in the model.
Based on our initial choice of parameter values, we find that pulse
fishing is the optimal behaviour of the fishing fleet and that it is optimal
for the fishery to stay closed most of the time. Looking at the sensitivity of
our results to parameter changes, price and stock volatilities do not affect
the switching curves much. The maximum harvest rate of the fishing
fleet, on the other hand, significantly affects the optimal switching curves.
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Further, it turns out that one of the effects of having a larger harvesting
capacity is a more stable stock, even under "bang-bang" harvest policy.
Many fisheries are being harvested by fleets, which also take part in
other fisheries. From time to time, when the conditions allow for it, the
fleet enters a particular fishery, harvests the stock down, before, once again,
moving on to other fisheries. Such fisheries serve to illustrate the relevance
of the regime-switching model defined and analysed in this paper. While
we study a single fishery and assume lump-sum costs to increasing and
decreasing the harvest rate, the resulting optimal behaviour, pulse fishing,
is found in many real-world fisheries.
The current analysis can be extended in several ways. First, we assume
a fixed capacity, which is reflected in the constant maximum harvest rate
of the fishing fleet. The analysis can be extended by incorporating capacity
as a third state variable (e.f. the deterministic model by Clark et al., 1979).
When capital is subject to depreciation, the manager must decide upon
an optimal investment policy in addition to the optimal harvest policy.
This extension would however increase the complexity of the analysis
dramatically. Second, the cost of changing the harvest rate can be assumed
to increase with the magnitude of the adjustment made in fishing fleet or
harvest rate. This will perhaps give a more accurate depiction of the reality
in most fisheries. Another possibility for future research is to apply the
model to a real-world fishery.
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Chapter 5
Cost Structure and Capacity in the
Norwegian Pelagic Fisheries 1
1A version of this chapter has been accepted for publication inApplied Economics.
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Abstract
The parameters of the short-run cost function are estimated for three vessel
types taking part in the Norwegian pelagic fisheries: purse seine vessels,
trawlers, and coastal vessels. The generalised translog functional form is
used. Estimates of returns to scale are calculated and the results indicate
that there are substantial economies of scale in all vessel classes. We further
investigate whether excess capacity varies with vessel size and age. The
analysis suggests increased quotas per vessel to avoid rent dissipation.
With the total allowable catch given, the number of participating vessels
must be reduced.
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5.1 Introduction
The broad opinion in the Norwegian fishing industry is that there is consid-
erable excess capacity in the pelagic fisheries. Three vessel types participate
in these fisheries; coastal vessels, trawlers, and purse seine vessels. How-
ever, in a study of the fisheries using data for 1994-96, Bjørndal & Gordon
(2000) did not find evidence of large economies of scale. They conclude
that most of the returns from scale effects have already been captured, and
that only coastal vessels have more to gain by taking advantage of increas-
ing returns to scale. The purpose of this study is to reconsider the capacity
issue in the Norwegian pelagic fisheries using newly available data for the
years 1998-2000. Multi-output cost functions are estimated and returns to
scale (RTS) are computed for each of the three vessel classes as an indicator
of capacity utilisation.
Despite the results of Bjørndal & Gordon (2000), we expect to find
evidence of returns to scale in the fishery in question. Since the fishing fleet
is constantly being renewed, returns to scale might change with vessel age.
The continuous renewal of the fleet can also explain a possible change in
returns to scale since Bjørndal and Gordon's study. If new vessels are larger
than the ones they replace, overall returns to scale will be affected. We will
therefore investigate if and how returns to scale vary with vessel age and
size in each vessel class. This aspect has not been considered by Bjørndal
& Gordon (2000) and might give further insight into the capacity issue. An
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understanding of how returns to scale vary between different segments of
the fleet can be used to determine how best to allocate quotas among fleet
segments, and to choose which vessels, if any, should be withdrawn from
the fishery.
The pelagic fisheries are regulated with catch quotas and effort regu-
lations. Total allowable catches (TACs) are set annually for commercial
species and are then distributed as 'group quotas' among three classes of
vessels. The further distribution of group quotas among vessels within
a group differs depending on species and vessel class. The purse seine
vessels are provided individual vessel quotas (IVQs) in all their fisheries.
IVQs are allocated to trawlers in their main fisheries (primarily demersal
species). For other species, trawlers are allowed to fish within maximum
quotas. Under a maximum quota there is an upper limit to a vessel's total
catch of a species. The sum of maximum quotas is larger than the group
quota and the fishery is therefore closed before all vessels have landed their
maximum quotas.? Maximum quotas are employed in all of the coastal
vessels' fisheries.
A quota-transfer system called the unit quota system was introduced
in the trawler and purse seine fleets in the early 2000 by the Norwegian
government to address the capacity problem (Norwegian Ministry of Fish-
eries 2004). Under the unit quota system, the number of assigned (unit)
quotas is larger than the number of participating vessels. If a vessel with
2See Aarland & Bjørndal (2002) on fisheries management in Norway.
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unit quotas is withdrawn from the fishery, its quotas, reduced by 20% (re-
distributed among all remaining vessels in the fishery), can be transferred
to and used by other vessels for 13 to 18 years.
Gordon (1954) identified how overcapitalisation and overfishing would
be a problem in an open-access fishery. Under open access, fishing effort
increases and the fish stock is depleted until fishing is no longer viable.
Although the Norwegian pelagic fisheries are no longer open access, the
regulatory regime has not eliminated the incentive to race for fish for every
vessel in the fishery. Trawlers and coastal vessels still have to operate
within maximum quotas in some or all of their fisheries. These vessels
will have incentives to overcapitalise. Munro & Scott (1985) identify the
problem of excess capacity in regulated fisheries, which they refer to as
class II open access. Homans &Wilen (1997) illustrate how regulated open-
access fisheries can have very high excess capacity. The introduction of
individual transferable quotas (ITQs), an approach based on assigning
property rights to the fish stocks, is a solution which has been proposed
to address these problems (see e.g. Grafton, 1996).Individual vessel quotas
are similar to ITQs but cannot be transferred between vessels. An IVQ
system will all the same reduce the incentives to overcapitalise since every
vessel is provided a guaranteed share of the TAC and therefore does not
need to race for fish. Economies of scale can be a sign of excess capacity in
a fishery.
The use of maximum quotas to regula te the coastal vessel's total harvest
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gives these vessels incentives to overcapitalise. We therefore expect to
find evidence of increasing returns to scale in the coastal fleet. Trawlers
largely operate under maximum quotas in the pelagic fisheries. These
quotas are, however, mainly by-catch quotas to restrict by-catch in the
trawlers' main fisheries, which primarily are demersal fisheries wherein
trawlers are assigned IVQs. If the main fisheries determine the degree of
capitalisation, there should be less overcapitalisation in the trawler fleet
than in the coastal fleet. Overcapitalisation and scale economies might,
however, still be present both in the trawl and the purse seine fisheries,
as the introduction of IVQs in these fisheries happened quite recently.
If there was excess capacity in the fisheries when the IVQ system was
introduced, there might still be excess capacity if the vessels have not had
strong enough incentives to reduce capacity. The IVQ system eliminates
the incentive to race for fish. Vessel owners have, however, no incentive
to withdraw vessels from the fishery, as they are not allowed to transfer or
allocate the withdrawn vessels' quotas among other vessels. This changes
if quotas are made transferable as under the individual transferable quota
system or, to some degree, under the Norwegian unit quota system.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, the
data set and the Norwegian pelagic fisheries are described. Section 5.3
presents the model and estimation results. The production structure of
the fishery and policy implications are analysed in section 5.4. The final
section summarises and concludes.
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5.2 The Norwegian Pelagic Fisheries
The data for the empirical analysis have been made available by the Nor-
wegian Directorate of Fisheries, which gathers data on a random sample of
vessels annually. The data include information on expenditures, revenues,
catches, and vessel specifications for vessels which are 13 metres overall
length and above.
Three vessel types are defined in the data set: purse seine, trawl, and
coastal vessels. The definitions are based on the technologies employed.
Purse seine vessels use a purse seine net to catch schools of fish. After
locating a school of fish, the vessel sails around it and surrounds the fish
with a wall of net. By closing the bottom of the seine, a purse is formed.
When the seine is pulled, the top of the purse is drawn closed and the
fish are trapped in the net purse. The purse seine is very effective when it
comes to harvesting pelagic schooling species like herring and mackerel.
Trawlers use a cone-shaped net (trawl) to harvest fish. By pulling the
net through deep water (pelagic trawl) or across the bottom (bottom trawl),
fish are scooped into the trawl. The trawlers operate mainly in the North
Sea.
Vessels in the coastal fleet are not as homogenous as vessels in the
two other vessel classes. Common factors for our observations on coastal
vessels are an overall vessellength of 27 metres or less and a harvest of 50
tonnes or more of Norwegian spring-spawning herring. Apart from this,
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the coastal fleet constitutes a diverse group of fishing vessels including
vessels employing the following fishing gear: gill net, hand line, long line,
Danish seine, trawl, etc. Most coastal vessels operate close to the coast
although this depends on among other things the fishing gear employed.
The data set covers the three-year period 1998-2000. Table 5.1 gives
the number of observations per year. For each vessel, data are available
on the following expenditures: fuel, product fees, bait etc., social costs,
insurance (vessel and other), maintenance (vessel and gear), miscellaneous,
labour, and depreciation based on historical cost. The catch and revenues
data consist of quantity (kg) and value in Norwegian Kroner (NOK) of
Norwegian spring-spawning herring, North Sea herring, mackerel, blue
whiting, capelin, sandeel, and' other species'. The following information
is available on vessels: vessel type (purse seine, trawler or coastal vessel),
length of vessel, gross registered tonnage, tonnage units, licensed capacity,
and age. All fish species specified in the data set are pelagic with the
Table 5.1: Observations per Vessel Type per Year
1998
1999
2000
Total
78
65
79
222
30
25
29
84
51
55
69
175
Purse seine Trawler Coastal vessel
exception of sandeel and 'other species'. Sandeel is a demersal species
but it alternates between staying on or close to the bottom and swimming
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in schools in the water column. Blue whiting belongs to the cod family,
but is nevertheless considered a pelagic species. Blue whiting is normally
harvested at 300-400meters depth. Norwegian spring-spawning herring,
North Sea herring, and mackerel are schooling species most often found
and harvested close to the surface. Capelin, a member of the salmon
family, is also a pelagic species found in schools. While the other fish
species mentioned here are caught along the Norwegian cost, in the North
Sea, in the Norwegian Sea, and/or in the West-Atlantic, the capelin fishery
takes place far north; from Spitzbergen in the west and eastward in the
Barents Sea.
As can be seen in Table 5.1, the data set consists of 222 observations
on purse seine vessels. In terms of revenues, Norwegian spring-spawning
herring is most important to purse seine vessels, followed by mackerel,
blue whiting, and North Sea herring (Table 5.2). Blue whiting is the largest
species measured by volume. However, not all purse seine vessels har-
vest blue whiting, capelin, and sandeel. Data on trawlers are available
for vessels that have caught more than 50 tonnes of Norwegian spring-
spawning herring. The data set includes a total of 84 observations on
trawlers (Table 5.1). As can be seen in Table 5.2, sandeel brings in the
highest revenues for the average trawler followed by Norwegian spring-
spawning herring, blue whiting, and mackerel. We have 175observations
on coastal vessels. All of these vessels have harvested more than 50 tonnes
of Norwegian spring-spawning herring. The data set shows that coastal
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vessels do not participate in the blue whiting or sandeel fisheries (Table
5.2). The Norwegian spring-spawning herring fishery generates the largest
share of revenues for the average coastal vessel and is also largest in terms
of quantity. Landings of all pelagic species can be reduced to fish oil and
Table 5.2: Average Harvest, Value, and Price per Vessel, 1998-2000, by
Vessel Type (Harvest in Tonnes, Value in Thousand 2000 NOK, Price in
Norwegian Kroner/kg)
Species Quantity Value Price
Herring 4904 9244 1.885
Mackerel 1198 6921 5.778
Blue whiting 5638 3805 0.675
Purse seine Capelin 1746 1943 1.113
Sandeel 304 229 0.753
Other species 498 1038 2.083
Total 14287 23179 1.622
Herring 1138 1545 1.357
Mackerel 55 243 4.437
Blue whiting 1082 713 0.659
Trawl Capelin 216 201 0.931
Sandeel 3046 2272 0.746
Other species 949 2275 2.396
Total 6486 7249 1.118
Herring 1160 1669 1.439
Mackerel 141 713 5.074
Blue whiting 1 O -
Coastal vessel Capelin 61 103 1.676
Sandeel O O -
Other species 406 2602 6.404
Total 1768 5087 2.877
fish meal. While landings of herring and mackerel are also delivered for
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human consumption, capelin and blue whiting are almost exclusively used
in the production of fish meal and fish oil. A higher price is typically ob-
tained for landings delivered for human consumption and, as a result, high
quality herring and mackerel are normally delivered for human consump-
tion. Both harvesting method and the way fish are stored vary between
the fleets, affecting the quality and consequently the price of landed fish.
Average first-hand prices of harvest, measured in 2000 NOK, by fleet
and species are presented in Table 5.2. The table confirms that prices
depend on vessel type. Purse seine vessels obtain the highest price for
almost every species. The exception is capelin for which coastal vessels
obtain the highest price. Trawlers obtain the lowest prices for all species.
Note that average price of' other species' is not comparable between vessel
classes. For coastal vessels, other species are seen to be very valuable.
As some of these vessels utilise fishing gear which makes it possible to
harvest and land valuable fish of very high quality, the high price obtained
for these catches raises the average price of 'other species'.
The vessels range in age from less than one year to 62 (purse seine), 51
(trawlers), and 111 years (coastal vessels). The average vessel in the data
set is 23 years old. The trawlers are on average the oldest fleet segment,
followed by purse seine and coastal vessels. Table 5.3 shows upper limits
for capacity and age quartiles by vessel group. Tonnage units, a measure of
vessel size, are used as measure of vessel capital for purse seine vessels and
trawlers, whereas gross registered tonnage (GRT) are used as the capital
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measure for coastal vessels. The available data do not allow us to use the
same capital measure for all three vessel types. For the vast majority of
coastal vessels, data are available on GRT and not on tonnage units, for
most trawlers and purse seine vessels, on the other hand, only data on
tonnage units are available.
Table 5.3: Upper Limits for Capacity and Age Quartiles (Capacity in
Tonnage Units, T, or Gross Registered Tonnage, GRT, Age in Years)
Capacity Age
Purse S. (T) Trawl (T) Coastal (GRT) Purse S. Trawl Coastal
Q1 654 265 54 11 19 11
Q2 983 308 93 21 24 16
Q3 1567 402 133 33 36 30
5.3 Empirical Specification and Estimation
The duality approach offers a framework for analysing the harvest tech-
nology and cost structure of the fishing firms. Empirical knowledge of
the relationship between input factors and outputs can be used to analyse
capacity utilisation in the fishery. The purpose of this section is to gain the
necessary empirical knowledge of harvesting for the three vessel types in
the Norwegian pelagic fisheries. We start out by specifying the empirical
model.
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5.3.1 Empirical Model
The quantity landed by a vessel is given by the vessels' quotas if the quota
constraints are binding.' The rational fishermen then minimise costs given
their quota restrictions, rather than maximise profits.' Harvest can in this
case be explained by a harvest or production function Y = j(X,K), where
y is an output vector, K is capacity or capital (assumed fixed), and X is
an input vector. The fishermen's cost minimisation problem can thus be
written as:
VC(W, Y,K) = min {W' X: j(X,K) = Y},
xso
(5.1)
where W is a vector of input prices (variable inputs).
The vessels' variable costs are mainly wages, fuel, and vessel and gear
maintenance. As crew remuneration is a given fraction of the vessel's
catch value, we disregard wages. The data are therefore used to define
two price indices. First, a price index for fuel wf that measures the cost of
purchasing fueL The data set does not include information on the quantity
of fuel used or purchased. A proxy variable for fuel quantity is calculated
based on a Cobb-Douglas aggregator function. Equal weight is given to
vessellength and total catch quantity in the aggregator function and the
price index of fuel is defined as expenditure on fuel divided by the proxy
variable. Second, we define the vessel-price index Wv as expenditure on
3We assume that vessels for which the quota constraints are not binding also minimise
costs.
4It follows that we assume price taking behaviour.
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insurance (vessel and other), maintenance (vessel and gear), bait etc., and
'other costs' divided by the vessel's total catch quantity. The vessel-price
index is an aggregate index measuring the cost of maintenance of vessel
and gear and the insurance cost.
Summary statistics for price indices can be found in Table 5.4. While
the fuel price index has been increasing significantly over the period, the
vessel price index is seen to be more stable. The increase in the fuel-price
index is likely to reflect the corresponding increase in the price of oil. The
coastal vessels have the lowest price index of fuel and the highest price of
maintaining vessel and gear. The difference in fuel prices between purse
seine vessels and trawlers is seen to be small whereas the vessel price index
is higher for purse seine vessels than for trawlers.
The generalised translog functional form (Caves et al., 1980) is used to
specify the cost function:
lnv'C, = a + '\' a·In w· + ~ '\' '\' f3 .. In ze.In w·i...Ji I I 2 i...Ji i...Jj IJ I J
+ Lm amY~) + ~ Lm Ln f3mny~)y~Å) (5.2)
+ Li Lm f3imInWiY~) + aK In K + ~f3KK(In K)2
+ Li f3iKIn to, In K + Lm f3mKY~)In K + atDt + et,
where VC is the sum of variable costs in period t, D, is a year dummy/' e is
5As an alternative to additively including dummy variables for year like we have done
here, terms in the cost equation could have been multiplied by the dummy variables,
giving us the opportunity to analyse if and how different parameters change from year
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an error term, i, j are input factors (fuel and vessel, as defined above) and
m, n are outputs. The superscript in parentheses represents the Box-Cox
transformation of outputs: y(lI) == (yll - 1)/ A, where A is a transformation
parameter. y(lI) ~ InY as A ~ O, thus with A = O the model reduces
to the standard translog function. As we are dealing with multi-product
Table 5.4: Factor Price Indices by Vessel Type, 1998-2000 (Standard Errors
in Parentheses)
WI Wv
1998 51.36 (13.68) 26,179.55 (12,914.62)
Purse seine 1999 61.66 (17.72) 23,201.57 (12,069.91)
2000 96.96 (31.05) 24,040.51 (11,055.89)
1998 49.06 (22.72) 8,490.27 (4,562.29)
Trawl 1999 62.83 (20.59) 6,960.80 (3,226.28)
2000 108.90 (41.30) 6,882.66 (2,707.91)
1998 33.79 (15.37) 5,454.68 (3,051.37)
Coastal vessel 1999 38.38 (16.74) 5,235.02 (2,361.58)
2000 57.87 (21.61) 5,528.79 (2,646.39)
firms for which zero-output observations may occur, it is inappropriate
to use the ordinary translog functional form. The generalised translog
function allows for zero-output observations and is therefore preferred.
Several other functional forms have been suggested for estimating cost
functions for multi-product firms, including the composite cost function
of Pulley & Braunstein (1992). Pulley and Braunstein found that when
the generalised translog function is a close approximation to the standard
to year.
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translog function, i.e., for small values of A,the generalised translog might
cause problems when estimating economies of scope. The generalised
translog functional form is used in the current analysis despite the reported
shortcomings.
By applying Shephard's Lemma, the cost share equations associated
with equation 5.3 can be written as:
(5.3)
where Si is a cost share, and u, is an error term. Equation 5.3 and the share
equation for fuel (sf) are estimated using iterative Seemingly Unrelated
Regression (SUR). By dropping one of the share equations from the system,
the singularity problem, arising from the fact that the cost shares sum
to one, is avoided. The iterative procedure converges to the maximum-
likelihood results. Maximum-likelihood estimates of the cost function
and share equations are invariant to which equation is dropped (Barten,
1969). The following estimation routine is used: The system of equations
is estimated for different values of the Box-Cox transformation parameter,
O < A < 1. Estimation results and Å are reported for the regression that
yields the highest log-likelihood value."
For the cost function to be well behaved, it must satisfy homogeneity of
6As a consequence of the estimation procedure, A is taken as given when the other
parameters of the cost function are estimated. The reported standard errors are there-
fore lower than they would be if all parameters, including the Box-Cox transformation
parameter, A, were estimated simultaneously.
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degree one, monotonicity, and convexity in factor prices (Diewert, 1974).
Linear homogeneity can be imposed by adding the following linear para-
metric restrictions on the estimated cost function: Li {3i = I, for i= f,v,and
Lil {3il = Liv {3iv = LiK {3iK = Lim {3im = O,for i = f,v, which must hold for
all m (outputs). Monotonicity and convexity in prices can be tested after
estimation and are satisfied if the fitted cost shares are positive and the
Hessian matrix of the cost function with respect to factor prices is negative
semi-definite.
5.3.2 Measuring Capacity and Capacity Utilisation
There is excess capacity in a fishery if the potential catch of the current fleet
is larger than the current catch. Excess capacity is a short-run measure as
it is self correcting in a well-functioning market. Excess capacity should
not be confused with overcapacity, which is a long-run concept measur-
ing potential output against a target level of output (see e.g. Ward et al.,
2004). To measure capacity utilisation we need to define capacity output.
How much is produced at full capacity? The economic literature does not
provide an unambiguous definition and several different approaches have
been suggested.
There is a large literature on capacity and capacity utilisation. The focus
will in this paper be on economic definitions as opposed to physical defin-
itions. In the following we will briefly present some measures of capacity
suggested in the economic literature. For a more comprehensive presenta-
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tion of different capacity measures, see e.g. Coelli et al. (2002). Klein (1960)
suggested a measure of capacity defined by the tangency point between
the short run (SRAC) and long run average cost (LRAC) functions. Berndt
& Morrison (1981) defined capacity output as the minimum point on the
SRAC function. Coelli et al. (2002) suggest a capacity measure where output
capacity is given by the point that maximises short-run profits. Segerson
& Squires (1990) show how single-output measures of capacity can be
generalised to the multi-output case.
Estimates of returns to scale can be used as indicators of capacity util-
isation. If we define capacity output as the output that minimises short
run average costs cf. Segerson & Squires (1990), increasing returns to scale
implies excess capacity, as minimum average cost corresponds to RTS=1.
An indicator of returns to scale for a multi-product firm with a fixed factor
corresponding to the cost function (5.3) is given by:
(5.4)
where RTS greater (less) than one means increasing (decreasing) returns to
scale (cf. Caves et aL, 1980; Panzar & Willig, 1977).
Capacity utilisation in the Norwegian pelagic fisheries is analysed in
section 5.4 but first we need to estimate the model.
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5.3.3 Estimation Results
We now tum to the estimation of cost functions for the pelagic fisheries.
There has been no significant change in the technology employed in these
fisheries over the three-year period in question. There has, on the other
hand, been a slight change in the size of the fish stocks. To find out if
this has any effect on the estimated cost parameters, tests using dummy
variables for year were carried out (cf. equation 5.3). The results did not
show any significant change in costs. The annual data are therefore pooled.
All right-hand side variables are centred on the mean of the variable in the
data set for estimation.
Different vessel types take part in different fisheries. This is reflected in
the output definitions of the estimated cost functions; the same outputs are
not defined for the three vessel types, as can be seen in Table 5.5. Aggre-
gation of different species is done based on quantity. Outputs consisting
of more than one species are therefore measured in total quantity. Based
on prior knowledge of the fisheries, cost functions were estimated for each
vessel type with alternative output definitions. The output definitions that
scored highest on number of significant variables, adjusted R-squared, etc.
when estimating the cost functions were chosen. Notice how the defined
outputs reflect similarities among species in terms of behaviour as well
as other factors like distance from shore to fishing areas, if the species
for the most part are delivered for human consumption or for reduction,
etc. Estimation results are shown in Table 5.6. For all vessel classes, the
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Table 5.5: Output Definitions
Trawl
Herring Mackerel
Capelin
Blue whiting
Sandeel
Other species
Output A OutputB Output C Output Others
Purse seine
Herring
Mackerel
Capelin
Sandeel Blue whiting
Other species
Coastal vessel Herring Blue whiting
Capelin
Mackerel
Sandeel
Other species
estimated cost functions explain approximately 95% of the variation in the
underlying data. Tests of regularity conditions were carried out and the
results imply that monotonicity and convexity in prices are satisfied. Most
of the estimated parameters are significant at the 5% level. The fit of the
models are therefore reasonable.
Having established and estimated the model, we now turn to the analy-
sis of production structure and implications for regulation of the fishery.
5.4 Production Structure and Policy Implications
Before we can say anything about policy implications we need to charac-
terise the structure of the production processes. The main purpose is to
analyse returns to scale in different vessel classes to establish if excess ca-
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Table 5.6: Generalised Translog Cost Function, Estimates with Standard
Errors: Purse Seine, Trawl, and Coastal Vessel
Purse seine Trawl Coastal vessel
Parameter Estimate Std.Err. Estimate Std.Err. Estimate Std.Err.
A 0.589 0.651 0.0720
af 0.240** 0.002 0.340** 0.003 0.183** 0.003
av 0.760** 0.002 0.660** 0.003 0.817** 0.003
aff 0.171** 0.002 0.199** 0.004 0.130** 0.003
avv 0.171** 0.002 0.199** 0.004 0.130** 0.003
afv -0.171** 0.002 -0.199** 0.004 -0.130** 0.003
aA 0.157** 0.052 0.136** 0.044 0.063 0.039
aB 0.056** 0.016 0.063** 0.013
ac 0.083** 0.008
aot 0.025** 0.006 0.065** 0.016 0.034 0.025
13M -0.418* 0.240 -0.118 0.083 0.196** 0.059
{3BB 0.098** 0.034 -0.012 0.014
{3cc 0.019* 0.011
{3otot 0.007 0.007 -0.015 0.021 0.165** 0.052
{3AB -0.036 0.058 0.005 0.039
{3AC -0.007 0.030
{3Aot 0.015 0.024 -0.027 0.032 -0.131** 0.045
{3BC -0.002 0.010
{3Bot -0.001 0.009 -0.046** 0.013
{3cot -0.005 0.003
{3fA 0.039** 0.012 0.007 0.012 0.059** 0.006
{3vA -0.039** 0.012 -0.007 0.012 -0.059** 0.006
{3fB 0.014** 0.004 0.047** 0.005
{3vB -0.014** 0.004 -0.047** 0.005
{3fc 0.023** 0.001
{3vc -0.023** 0.001
{3fot -0.006** 0.001 0.032** 0.005 0.025** 0.005
{3vot 0.006** 0.001 -0.032** 0.005 -0.025** 0.005
aK -0.047* 0.028 -0.069 0.059 0.018 0.039
{3KK 0.022 0.079 0.461* 0.265 -0.096 0.091
{3fK 0.040** 0.006 0.087** 0.019 0.024 0.025
{3vK -0.040** 0.006 -0.087** 0.019 0.008 0.034
{3AK 0.035 0.124 -0.046 0.104 0.019 0.058
{3BK -0.060 0.039 -0.092 0.057
{3CK -0.021 0.018
{3otK -0.010 0.012 -0.067 0.066 -0.039 0.060
ao 16.014** 0.012 15.049** 0.013 14.297** 0.015
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pacity is present and, if so, to what extent. We start by looking at measures
of elasticity. Table 5.7 shows returns to scale (equation 5.4) and input-price
Table 5.7: Returns to Scale and Input Price Elasticities with Standard
Errors: Purse Seine, Trawl, and Coastal Vessel
Coefficient Standard Error
RTS 3.252 0.494
Purse seine Fuel -0.046 0.012
Vessel -0.014 0.004
RTS 4.037 0.640
Trawl Fuel -0.076 0.013
Vessel -0.039 0.007
RTS 10.140 4.727
Coastal vessel Fuel -0.110 0.015
Vessel -0.025 0.004
elasticities calculated for each vessel type and evaluated at mean levels.
The reported own-price elasticities are all significant at a 5% level, negative,
and indicate that the response to price changes is rather inelastic. Purse
seine vessels seem to have a more inelastic response to changes in both of
the two input prices than the other vessel types. Bjørndal & Gordon (2000),
who used the same price indices in their analysis, also report inelastic fac-
tor demand. Inhis study of the ITQ regulated surf clam and ocean quahog
fishery, Weninger (1998) reports inelastic input-price responses. Dupont
(1991) estimates a normalised quadratic restricted profit function for the
British Columbia salmon fishery, which is regulated by input restrictions.
Her empirical analysis shows that the elasticities of the unrestricted in-
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puts are inelastic. Other studies in the fisheries economics literature report
elastic factor demand. Most of the fisheries analysed in these studies are,
however, subject to other regulatory regimes.
We now tum to the question of whether there is excess capacity in the
Norwegian pelagic fleet. The estimates of returns to scale reported in Table
5.7 are significant at a 5% level, and they indicate substantial economies of
scale in every vessel class. Recall that we used measures of vessel size as a
proxy for capital: tonnage units measure capital for purse seine vessels and
trawlers, and GRT measures the capital for coastal vessels. For purse seine
vessels and trawlers, the estimates are significantly larger than two at the
5% level. This strongly implies that there is considerable excess capacity
in these fisheries. Estimated RTS are very high for coastal vessels, but the
standard error for this estimate is large and we cannot establish whether
RTS are above one for coastal vessels at the 5% significance level. Bjørndal
& Gordon (2000) found evidence of returns to scale in their analysis of the
fishery. Their estimates of RTS are, however, much smaller than the ones
reported in Table 5.7.
The difference in estimated returns to scale between Bjørndal & Gor-
don (2000) and this study can be due to changes in vessel quotas. If vessel
quotas were much higher in the period for which Bjørndal and Gordon
did their study, this can explain why the degree of returns to scale has in-
creased in the meantime. The capelin fishery was closed from 1994 through
1998, a period that covers the entire data set used by Bjørndal and Gordon
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(the years 1994-96). Capelin is, on the other hand, an important source of
income for some of the vessels in our data set. The quotas of Norwegian
spring-spawning herring have also increased, while quotas of North Sea
herring and mackerel, with the exception of the coastal fleet's mackerel
quota, have been reduced. The total quotas of herring, the commercially
most important pelagic species, have however increased rather than de-
creased. The difference in quotas per vessel does therefore not seem to
explain the relatively large difference in estimated returns to scale between
the study by Bjørndal & Gordon (2000) and our study. As we are dealing
with pelagic fisheries for which the stock-output elasticity is expected to
be small (cf. Bjørndal, 1987), changes in stock should not affect estimated
cost parameters very much.
Several other studies in the fisheries economics literature deal with the
question of returns to scale. Asche et al. (2002) find evidence of substan-
tial scale economies for Norwegian cod trawlers operating under an IVQ
system. Increasing RTS are also reported in other studies of fisheries, e.g.
by Weninger (1998) in his analysis of the surf clam and ocean quahog fish-
ery. As Asche et al. (2002) note, most of the RTS estimates in the fisheries
economics literature show decreasing returns to scale (e.g. Alam et al.,
2002; Squires, 1987a,b; Squires & Kirkley, 1991). The regulatory regime in
fisheries where one finds decreasing RTS is typically different from that of
the fisheries with increasing RTS.
The fact that regulations have been changing over the years might
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suggest that returns to scale vary with vessel age. This could be the case
if the current regulatory regime is taken into account when investments in
vessels are made. It seems most likely to find evidence of such change in
the purse seine fleet, where an IVQ system was introduced in the late 1980s.
If vessels built after the introduction of the IVQ system have lower RTS
than other purse seine vessels, this could indicate that the introduction
of IVQs in the purse seine fleet has helped reduce excess capacity and
consequently reduced rent dissipation in the fishery. The problem of excess
capacity will then become smaller as time passes by. It might also be useful
to investigate whether returns to scale change with vessel capacity within
vessel classes. Such variations would have implications for how quotas
should be reallocated to take advantage of scale effects. Fishing vessels
are provided quotas depending on, inter alia, the size of the vessel and
size could therefore matter. It has also been suggested that the smaller
vessels have been provided relatively large shares of the TAC (Aarland &
Bjørndal, 2002). If this is true, we should find lower returns to scale for
smaller vessels.
To find out whether returns to scale vary with vessel capacity or vessel
age, RTS are calculated for the average vessel in every capacity and age
quartile. Capacity and age ranges for the quartiles can be found in Table
5.3. Results with standard errors are reported in Tables 5.8 and 5.9. Table
5.8 shows returns to scale for the average vessel by vessel-age quartile.
The results do not show significant differences between age quartiles in
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any vessel class at the 5% significance level. We nevertheless find that
the point estimate of RTS for purse seine vessels is increasing with vessels'
age. The point estimate of RTS for the youngest purse seine vessels (:$ 10.75
years of age) are 2.97, while the same estimate for the oldest vessels are
3.63. For trawlers the point estimates of RTS are seen to be lowest for the
two age quartiles in the middle. The four point estimates for coastal vessels
are almost identical, but only for quartiles Q1 and Q3 are RTS significantly
larger than unity. Returns to scale for the average vessel by vessel-capacity
Table 5.8: RTS hy Vessel Age with Standard Errors. RTS for Average
Vessel in Quartile Reported.
Purse seine Trawl Coastal vessel
Q1 2.969 (0.461) 4.470 (0.939) 10.395 (4.501)
Q2 3.274 (0.604) 3.757 (0.508) 9.858 (4.745)
Q3 3.423 (0.520) 3.719 (0.528) 9.232 (3.943)
Q4 3.628 (0.568) 4.511 (0.862) 11.493 (7.054)
Table 5.9: RTS by Vessel Capacity with Standard Errors. RTS for Average
Vessel in Quartile Reported.
Purse seine Trawl Coastal vessel
Q1 3.095 (0.483) 3.206 (0.325) 13.628 (9.908)
Q2 3.594 (0.572) 3.795 (0.544) 11.881 (6.106)
Q3 3.419 (0.587) 4.986 (1.206) 11.191 (5.573)
Q4 3.245 (0.699) 18.657 (26.540) 10.313 (4.827)
quartile are reported in Table 5.8. Looking only at the point estimates, the
results suggest that RTS in the trawler fleet are increasing with capacity,
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and the largest trawlers seem to have very high returns to scale. In the
coastal fleet, all the vessels seem to have very high scale returns. The
standard errors of the estimates are however very large, and RTS are not
significantly larger than one for any of the vessel-capacity quartiles. There
is little or no difference in the point estimates of RTS among purse seine
vessels of different sizes. At the 5% significant level we cannot state that
there are significant differences in RTS between vessels of different size
(capacity) in any vessel class. This study therefore does not find statistical
support for the hypothesis that the degree of excess capacity in the fishery
depends on vessel size.
The fact that we did not find significant differences between age and
capacity quartiles for any vessel class suggests that the problem of excess
capacity is present in a large part of the pelagic fleet. As seen in Tables
5.8 and 5.9, nearly all estimates of the RTS indicator for the purse seine
and trawler fleets are significantly larger than two. The exceptions are the
two estimates for capacity quartiles Q4. For trawlers, the standard error of
this estimate is very large, whereas we only have statistical support to say
that RTS are significantly larger than 1.87 not 2.00 for capacity quartile Q4
of the purse seine fleet. The significance of RTS estimates for the coastal
vessels, as presented in Tables 5.8 and 5.9, are not nearly as high.
As we noted in section 5.3.2, full capacity can be defined as the output
quantity that minimises average costs, i.e., the output level for which
RTS=1. When the vessels are producing several outputs, there is more than
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one way to capture the scale benefits as many different output combinations
result in RTS=1. By looking at ray measures of economic capacity, where
it is assumed that all outputs increase or decrease in fixed proportions,
the problem can be reduced to a single-product problem and subsequently
solved for RTS=1. Ray returns to scale equal unity corresponds to the
minimum point on the ray average cost curve. When trying to apply this
to the estimated cost functions for the Norwegian pelagic fishery in order to
calculate the degree of excess capacity, we find that the average-cost curves
do not have a minimum for any of the vessel groups (i.e., ray returns
to scale are never equal to one). The estimated average cost curves are
decreasing everywhere for increasing (ray) output and do not have the "U"
shape we generally expect. Remember that the translog functional form
provides a good approximation to the underlying function in the point of
approximation. As we move away from this point, however, the trans log
function performs poorer and poorer. A very plausible explanation for
why the estimated ray-average cost curves do not have the "U" shape is
that our observations are far from full capacity utilisation. Although this
means we cannot calculate the degree of excess capacity, it is another strong
indication of high excess capacity in the Norwegian pelagic fishery. Even
if the ray average cost curves would have had the expected "U" shape,
an estimate of capacity utilisation would have been highly uncertain since
the observations in the data set only cover the part of the cost curve where
there is a high degree of excess capacity.
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Making the standard assumption that a manager wants to maximise
net revenues from the fishery, estimates of cost functions can be used to
suggest how quotas should be optimally redistributed both within and
between vessel classes. Our data set only contains information on vessels
participating in the pelagic fisheries. This means that we have data on
all purse seine vessels but only on distinct groups of vessels from the
coastal and trawler fleets. The full production structure of the fleets should
be taken into account when analysing the optimal reallocation of quotas
between vessel classes. This question will therefore not be addressed in
the current analysis.
5.5 Concluding Remarks
We set out to estimate cost functions for the different vessel groups taking
part in the Norwegian pelagic fisheries. The purpose was to measure scale
economies in the fishing fleet. Cost functions were estimated for coastal
vessels, trawlers, and purse seine vessels using annual data covering the
period 1998-2000. In a similar analysis, but using data for the years 1994-
96, Bjørndal & Gordon (2000) estimated returns to scale to be increasing
but close to one. According to their results, only slight reductions in
average cost can be gained by taking advantage of scale effects in the
fishery. Despite the findings by Bjørndal & Gordon (2000), the common
opinion in the industry has been that there is substantial excess capacity
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in the pelagic fishery. This discrepancy and the availability of new data
motivated the current analysis.
We find evidence of substantial returns to scale in the Norwegian
pelagic fisheries. Our estimates of returns to scale in the trawl and purse
seine fleets seem robust and suggest that large scale economies are present.
Estimated returns to scale for coastal vessels are also substantial but the
estimates are not significantly different from one. It should be noted that
the measure of returns to scale used in the analysis is only an indicator
of the actual scale economies of the fishing fleet. Nevertheless, the results
give support to the industryopinion of large excess capacity in the pelagic
fleet. The results are also in accordance with the economic literature on
regulated open-access fisheries.
We have looked at several explanations for why we find large returns
to scale in the Norwegian pelagic fishery, while Bjørndal & Gordon (2000)
only found evidence of minor returns to scale. First, a decrease in quotas
was suggested as a possible explanation. However, when looking at data
on annual quotas we could not find support for this hypothesis; quota
differences alone would not be enough to explain the difference in returns
to scale. Second, the fleet is constantly being renewed and the fleet studied
by Bjørndal and Gordon is not the same as the fleet in our data set. To see
if this could explain the difference in RTSwe tested if the degree of returns
to scale varies with vessel age. We did not find strong evidence for this
either.
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Excess capacity seems to be present in all vessel classes, and we find
the degree of excess capacity within each vessel class to be independent
of vessel age and size. This suggests that quotas per vessel should be
increased in every segment of the fleet. From an economic perspective, ex-
cess capacity should be dealt with by withdrawing the least effective vessel
from the fishery until there no longer is any excess capacity. Subsequently,
catch quotas should be reallocated both within and between vessel classes
to take advantage of scale effects. The largest gain (measured in cost re-
ductions) is obviously realised by reallocating quotas to the vessels with
the highest returns to scale. Our analysis does not point towards an un-
ambiguous solution to the problem of how best to reduce fishing capacity
and reallocate quotas. To better answer these questions, further analysis
of the cost and harvest structure of the Norwegian fishing fleet is required.
Until recently, there have been few incentives to reduce capacity in the
pelagic fleet. The recent introduction of a unit quota system in the purse
seine and trawl fisheries has changed this. The analysis suggests that
quotas per vessel should be increased considerably to take advantage of
scale effects. As the total allowable catch in the fishery is given, increased
vessel quotas can only be realised by withdrawing vessels from the fishery.
The unit quota system has the potential of making such capacity reduction
achievable. It will be interesting to see if the incentives provided by the
unit quota system are strong enough to reduce the excess capacity in the
fishery.
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